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This study extends the existing decision aid literature by examining the influence 
of decision aid recommendations on users’ memories, decision processes, and judgments.  
Existing research suggests that decision aids can be beneficial in a variety of settings.  
Judgments or decisions, the outputs of the decision-making process, are the focus of most 
of the decision aid research.  This study offers a more comprehensive investigation of the 
impact of decision aids by examining both the outputs of the decision-making process 
and the inputs and processes that lead to judgment and decision-making.  An experiment 
is conducted that examines the influence of decision aid recommendations on memory 
patterns, search, cue usage, and judgments.  Specifically, the study focuses on how 
positive and negative decision aid recommendations and the timing of receipt of the 
decision aid recommendation differentially affect these components of the decision 
process. 
The key findings of the research are: (1) decision aid recommendations create 
strong affective responses that are encoded in memory and cause users to reconstruct 
memories of financial data to be consistent with the affective response, (2) receiving a 
decision aid recommendation at the start of a task creates a strong initial response that 
acts as an initial hypothesis wherein users’ subsequent information search patterns exhibit 
a confirming bias, (3) receiving a decision aid recommendation later in the task creates a 
strong response that initiates professional skepticism and causes users’ subsequent 
information search patterns to exhibit a disconfirming bias, (4) decision aid 
recommendations influence the choice of information cues users believe to be important, 
(5) decision aid recommendations exert influence on users’ judgments, with the amount 
 
 v
of influence diminishing as additional information is received, and (6) working memory 
capacity is a determinant in the ability to recall financial information but does not 
determine the extent of influence decision aid recommendations have on users.  These 
findings, when considered together, validate the need for a more complete examination of 
how decision aids impact the entire decision-making process to identify potential 
negative consequences in addition to proposed benefits.  This research demonstrates that 
task structure can be manipulated to mitigate certain undesirable consequences of 
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Accounting firms implement decision aids to support decision-making processes 
because aids are immune to many human information-processing limitations.  The 
general ability of decision aids to outperform the judgment of unaided individuals has 
been supported in a variety of tasks.  Decision aids are particularly valuable in 
environments where decision tasks involve heavy information loads or severe cognitive 
burdens.  In these environments, information integration demands increase and decision 
quality typically decreases (Hwang and Lin 1999; Roch et al. 2000) because human 
decision-makers are more prone to exhibit decision biases, rely on simple decision 
heuristics, or become overwhelmed by processing demands and make judgment errors. 
To cope with increased information load, financial decision-makers may rely on 
affective responses rather than the numerical data itself (Kida and Smith 1995).  
Affective responses are summary positive or negative attitudes developed toward a set of 
data.  Affective responses to numerical data stored in long-term memory appear to be 
relatively immune to high load environments, while memory for numerical data seems to 
deteriorate rapidly as load increases (Roberts and Rose 2002).  Research has shown that 
financial decision-makers use affective responses stored in memory as primary inputs to 
decision-making (Kida et al. 1998, 2001; Rose 2001).  These studies demonstrate that 
reliance on affective responses can lead to inferior decision outcomes.  While affective 
responses may be developed toward a set of data, research has also shown that affective 
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responses may be developed toward something peripheral or unrelated to the data with 
similar memory and decision consequences (Kida et al. 2001; Rose 2001). 
 Decision-makers in high load situations are prone to rely heavily on affective 
responses, and decision aids are often employed in high load environments where they 
are most beneficial to users.  While empirical evidence suggests that decision aids are 
beneficial, a critical and unexplored issue concerns the potential for decision aids 
themselves to create affective responses and how these affective responses affect user 
memory and behavior.  As decision aids are becoming widely available for a large 
assortment of tasks, it is important to understand their impact on decision-makers.  
Although numerous studies have examined how decision aids affect decision outcomes, 
few have directly examined how decision aids affect users’ judgment and decision-
making processes. The lack of process studies makes it difficult to model decision 
processes in aided environments or to understand the effects of decision aids on users and 
decision outcomes. 
The primary objective of the proposed research is to investigate the effects of 
decision aids on their users by examining how decision aid recommendations are 
incorporated into users’ decision-making processes.  Specifically, this study will 
investigate the effects of decision aid recommendations on users’ memories, searches for 
information, cue usages, and judgments.  Given that decision aids are often implemented 
in environments where users may rely heavily on affective responses to data or peripheral 
cues, it is expected that decision aid recommendations will create affective responses that 
will be encoded in memory.  Further, the affective responses created by aid 
recommendations will affect users’ memory patterns, information search strategies, cue 
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usages, and judgments in potentially non-optimal ways.  Finally, this research posits that 
the effects of aid recommendations on decision processes will be dependent upon the 
timing of the decision aid’s recommendation.  When the aid’s recommendation is 
received early in the decision process, it is expected that information search patterns, cue 
usage, and judgments will change.  When the aid recommendation is received near the 
end of the decision process, however, memory reconstruction effects are anticipated. 
Results from this study will contribute to research of financial decision processes, 
decision aids, and memory of financial data, and will extend the emerging literature 
examining the effects of affective responses to data and peripheral cues on decision-
making.  The results of this study will be of interest to academics because the results 
make it possible to model financial decision-making processes in aided environments.  In 
addition to academic appeal, this study will be useful to practitioners because 
understanding the effects of decision aids on decision processes is necessary for decision 
aid designers and firms considering aid implementation.  Aid designers need process data 
to maximize the effectiveness of the aid, while minimizing potential biasing effects, and 
aid implementers need to understand the potential biases and dysfunctional behavior that 
aids may produce. The research will also contribute to the decision aid reliance literature.  
Researchers have traditionally measured reliance by comparing decisions with aid advice.  
When user decisions match aid recommendations, it has been assumed that aid users 
relied on the decision aid. As Kachelmeier and Messier (1990) and Rose (2002) suggest, 
agreement with the aid does not always translate to reliance on the aid, and disagreement 
does not necessarily indicate a lack of reliance.  Aid users may incorporate aid advice 
into their decision process and still make decisions that do not conform to aid 
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recommendations.  The process measures employed in this study will make it possible to 
examine how aid recommendations are used, irrespective of agreement between the 
user’s decision and the aid’s advice.  Further, by manipulating the timing of aid 
recommendations, this study will demonstrate that the method used to measure reliance 
will depend on the portion of the decision process that an aid affects.  Lastly, the results 
of the study will add to the literature on memory of financial data and the effect of 
affective responses on decision-making through examination of the impact of decision 




LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Human Judgment and Decision-making 
Numerous descriptions of the stages of decision-making exist (Beach and 
Mitchell 1978; Libby 1981; Einhorn and Hogarth 1981), all of which entail information 
processing evolving through three central stages: inputs, processing, and outputs (Libby 
and Lewis 1977; Arnold 1997).  Two primary inputs to decision-making are 
environmental information cues and memory contents.  Processing includes the cognitive 
decision processes individuals go through to arrive at an output.  This includes problem 
identification, hypothesis generation and evaluation, internal and external information 
search, cue usage, changes to memory structures and schemas, attention, and strategy 
(Bonner and Pennington 1991; Woffard and Goodwin 1990).  Outputs are the decisions 
or judgments made.  Errors or bias in inputs and/or decision processes may adversely 
affect outputs. 
Individuals are fallible in forming judgments and making decisions (Libby and 
Lewis 1977), and they are prone to a variety of cognitive biases that may negatively 
affect performance.  While decision-makers are generally good at selecting and coding 
information, they are poor at integrating it (Dawes 1979; Libby 1981; Bazerman 1994; 
Bonner and Pennington 1991) due to their limited ability to retain, retrieve, use, and 
process information (Libby et al. 2001).  They tend to be unreliable and inconsistent in 
decision-making, due to the influences of mood, subjective interpretations, and random 
fluctuations in decision-making (Bazerman 1994).  They are rationally bounded with a 
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tendency to satisfice and avoid cognitive effort through the use of heuristics (Libby and 
Lewis 1977; Hogarth 1993; Kleinmuntz 1990; Todd and Benbasat 1994).  While 
heuristics can be efficient and effective, they can also lead to sub-optimal performance.  
These limitations and biases affect both experienced and inexperienced decision-makers 
alike (Smith and Kida 1991).  In short, both inputs and cognitive factors are the basis for 
individuals' less than optimal decision-making. 
To fully understand and improve judgment and decision-making, the underlying 
decision processes involved and the va riables affecting the processes must be examined 
(Kadous 1996; Libby and Luft 1993; Sutton 1993).  Svenson (1979) notes: 
“Human decision-making cannot be understood simply by studying final 
decisions.  The perceptual, emotional, and cognitive processes which ultimately 
lead to the choice of a decision alternative must also be studied if we want to gain 
an adequate understanding of human decision-making.” 
 
Although outcomes may be the focus, the processes leading up to those outcomes 
ultimately define the outcomes.  While early judgment and decision-making research 
focused on inputs and outcomes (Kadous 1996), research is moving beyond treating the 
processing stage as a “black box,” to examining the actual processes involved in getting 
from inputs to outputs. 
 
Inputs to Judgment and Decision-making 
Two primary inputs to decision-making are environmental information cues 
(external information) and contents of memory (internal information).  Task structure and 
the nature of the environment dictate the relative usage of these two types of inputs to the 
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decision-making process.  Additionally, individual characteristics determine the relative 
influence of these inputs. 
 
External Information 
A traditional objective of accounting is supplying information to individuals that 
is useful to decision-making.  Improving accounting information based decisions may be 
accomplished by improving the information set or increasing the ability of decision-
makers to use the information provided (Libby and Lewis 1977).  While individuals have 
little control over the content of environmental information cues, they do exercise control 
over the selection and integration of cues.  A considerable amount of research has 
examined the effect external information has on decision-making.  Findings support that 
decision-making is affected by the amount of information presented and the way 
information is presented.  Increasing the amount of information generally increases 
integration demands and decreases decision-making performance (Hwang and Lin 1999).  
The way information is presented can have a significant impact on decision-making as 
well (DeSanctis and Jarvenpaa 1989; Davis et al. 1987; Iselin 1989; Stone and Schkade 
1991; Frownfelter-Lohrke 1998).  Depending on task type, some presentation formats 
allow performance improvements over other formats (e.g., tables versus graphs).  While 
existing research has examined how accounting information system (AIS) design can 
mitigate the deleterious effects of increased amounts of information and improve 
decision-making through the presentation of external information, there are certain 






Unlike external information, individuals exercise considerable control over the 
contents and organization of their memories.  Individuals direct the choice of information 
and the method of encoding that information into their memories.  One line of research 
examining the influence of memory on decision-making explored memory organization 
and memory content.  Differences in the organization of memory lead to differences in 
recall ability (Frederick 1991).  When there is a mis-match between task structure and 
knowledge structures, performance ability in certain tasks and audit decisions suffers 
(Nelson et al. 1995; Ricchiute 1992).  Thus, the importance of memory organization on 
decision processes is evident. 
Memory content can affect decision-making when memory is a primary input to 
decision-making.  Despite the availability of external information, decision-makers often 
rely on their memories for many decisions.  Time pressure, costs of external search, the 
routine nature of the task, or confidence in one's memory may cause decision-makers to 
forgo external information search and search for information solely from memory 
(Hulland and Kleinmuntz 1994; Moeckel and Plumlee 1989).  Because of the task 
environment and the general overconfidence of decision-makers in their often- inaccurate 
memories, memory becomes a prime input to decision-making even when external search 
can yield the data upon which memories are based.  When memories are inputs to 
decision-making, bias in those memories can affect the decision processes and the final 
judgment in non-optimal ways. 
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Errors and bias in memory may exist for numerous reasons.  Poor learning 
environments and inadequate attention can introduce and intensify errors and bias in 
memory.  Another potential source of bias is the use of affective responses to data.  
Affective responses are summary positive or negative attitudes developed toward a set of 
numerical data.  Supported by psychology research, Kida and Smith (1995) proposed that 
memory traces for numerical data are relatively weak, hard to retrieve, and more easily 
erased compared to affective responses to the data.  Fuzzy processing preference theory 
argues people have a natural cognitive habit to use global gist (affective responses) due to 
the ease in processing and the reality that reasoning accuracy approaches that of verbatim 
traces (Brainerd and Reyna 1993).  As individuals are cognitive misers (Simon 1956), the 
use of summary evaluations is one mechanism to reduce cognitive effort (Hulland and 
Kleinmuntz 1994).  Indeed, Kida and Smith’s review of the research in a variety of 
disciplines indicates the extensive use of evaluative responses. 
While this heuristic may prove useful and effective in many situations, it may 
prove detrimental in others.  Kida et al. (1998) validated the differential encoding of 
affective responses to numerical data.  They found that affective responses to financial 
data are more accurately recalled than are the data themselves.  In addition, managers 
often reconstructed their memories for financial data to match affective responses to the 
data and made investment decisions influenced by affective responses.  Rose (2001) 
extended these findings to reveal that affective responses could be generated by 
something unrelated to the data.  He found that multimedia peripheral cues could cause 
an affective response and influence memory patterns and investment decisions.  Kida et 
al. (2001) found that information related to other persons involved in the decision 
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scenario generated affective responses that had an affect on decision choice.  The result 
of reliance on affective responses to data for decision-making is the potential for sub-
optimal decision-making.  Kida et al. (1998, 2001) and Rose (2001) all demonstrated that 
reliance on affective responses led to inferior investment decisions in certain decision 
contexts. 
 
Cognitive Processes in Judgment and Decision-making 
To better understand decision-making and to overcome deficiencies in decision-
making requires an examination of the decision processes in addition to the inputs and 
outputs.  As such, the focus of much judgment and decision-making research is on 
information processing.  The current study focuses on two primary decision processes: 




Information search is an important component of judgment and decision-making.  
Information search strategies are related to search effectiveness and overall performance 
(Cloyd 1995), and bias in search can lead to reduced performance levels.  Failing to 
consider all relevant information or halting search prematurely can negatively influence 
performance.  A wide body of literature has examined factors affecting search behavior.  
The structure of the task, the task environment, individual factors, and interactions 
between these three influence information search. 
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Search behavior is affected by variations in presentation format (Svenson 1979; 
Ford et al. 1989).  For example, Stone and Schkade (1991) found linguistic formats led to 
less compensatory search as compared to numerical formats.  Swain and Haka (2000) 
found that increases in information load also affect search behavior, with the proportion 
of information search reduced and the variability of search patterns increased.  
Accountability and motivation factors have also been found to affect search strategies 
(Lee et al. 1999). 
Individual differences may also affect search strategies.  Both experience and 
prior knowledge are associated with search behavior (Bedard et al. 1992; Hunton and 
McEwen 1997; Bedard and Mock 1992; Bouwman et al. 1987; Bonner and Pennington 
1991).  Personality type of the decision-maker (Kelliher 1990) and decision-makers’ 
problem solving strategies influence search (Moon and Keasey 1992).  Less persistent 
characteristics can also influence search.  For example, an individual’s mood affects 
his/her search strategies, with positive moods associated with more carefree and heuristic 
styles and negative moods associated with more systematic and purposeful styles (Hirt et 
al. 1997; Mittal and Ross 1998). 
 
Cue Usage 
Cue usage is another important part of judgment and decision-making.  Both 
proper information choice and information integration are necessary for optimal decision-
making.  Improper choice and/or mis-weighting of cues leads to poor performance.  
Individuals are generally good at selecting and coding information, yet poor at combining 
cues (Dawes 1979; Libby 1981; Bazerman 1994; Bonner and Pennington 1991).  In fact, 
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a general inability to integrate information is a primary reason human judgment and 
decision-making is often less than optimal. 
A large body of research has examined how individuals combine information to 
arrive at a decision, generally from one of three approaches: lens model, probabilistic 
judgment, and cognitive style (Libby and Lewis 1977).  Results of lens model studies 
demonstrate that complex human decision processes can be accurately predicted and cue 
usage estimated with simple linear models.  Probabilistic studies, using Bayes’ theorem, 
reveal that decision-makers use simplifying heuristics in information processing.  Studies 
on cognitive style show it to be an important moderating factor in human information 
processing.  Lens model and probabilistic studies only examine what cues people actually 
use and how they actually integrate them, while neglecting why cues were selected.  
Additionally, lens model studies fail to consider attention and memory, assuming all 
available cues are attended to (Birnberg and Shields 1984). 
In sum, judgment and decision-making suffers from a variety of cognitive biases.  
These biases may arise due to the structure of the task, the nature of the environment, or 
the characteristics of the decision-maker.  Exploration of methods or techniques to 
mitigate or overcome these biases and improve judgment and decision-making is 
warranted. 
 
Improving Individual Judgment and Decision-Making 
A variety of strategies exist to improve decision-making (Libby 1981; Bazerman 
1994).  Prior to determining how a deficiency may be corrected, it is first necessary to 
identify the source of the deficiency (Bonner 1999).  If the source of the deficiency is the 
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person, training may be beneficial if the decision-maker lacks the knowledge and skills 
needed for the task.  Experience and expertise acquired on the job may also eliminate 
deficiencies.  Informing the individual of the potential bias has been suggested as a 
means to improve judgment.  However, research has shown this to be ineffective as 
people continue to make biased decisions even when informed of their tendencies to do 
so (Bazerman 1994; Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  Similarly, a process of adjusting the 
individual's intuitive predictions in light of known biases that could be present has been 
suggested (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  If the source of the deficiency is the task or 
the environment, changing the structure of the task or the environment may alleviate 
some of the problems.  The use of decision aids has been suggested as one potential 
solution to deficiencies resulting from people and task structures. 
 
Decision Aids 
Decision aids have been recommended to support the decision-making process 
and help users overcome human information processing limitations and deficiencies 
(Libby 1981; Messier 1995; Brown and Eining 1997; Krishnamoorthy et al. 1999; 
Bonner et al. 1996).  From simple linear models to sophisticated expert systems 
employing artificial intelligence, decision aids can offer improvement to the decision-
making process in tasks or environments where individuals have proven to perform at 
less than optimal levels.  Decision aids can provide assistance in many ways, from 
imposing structure to the problem (Todd and Benbasat 1994), decomposing and 
recombining the problem (Bonner et al. 1996), generating alternate hypotheses (Chu 
1991), making a recommendation, or providing a final solution (Kowalczyk and Wolfe 
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1998).  The superiority of models, even improper ones, over people in making predictions 
has been widely supported, in both accounting and non-accounting settings (Hogarth 
1993; Kleinmuntz 1990; Bell and Carcello 2000; Peterson and Pitz 1986; Whitecotten 
1996; Hoch and Schkade 1996; Dawes 1979; Goldstein and Hogarth 1997). 
In general, individuals’ integration processes are well approximated by linear 
models and people appear to rely on a relatively small subset of available data.  Decision 
aids may be able to correct for human inconsistency and the mis-weighting of cues that 
contributes to poor performance (Libby 1981; Bazerman 1994).  Decision aids are not 
subject to many of the cognitive biases that individuals are, such as inconsistency, the 
inappropriate use of heuristics, and the tendency to satisfice.  For example, Butler (1985) 
demonstrated a simple decision aid could help overcome the tendency to underweight or 
ignore distribution information. 
 
Types of Decision Aids 
Gorry and Scott-Morton (1971) provide a classification of decision structure at 
three levels: structured, semi-structured, and unstructured (Messier 1995).  Decision aids 
have been proposed at all three levels: deterministic decision aids at the structured level, 
decision support systems at the semi-structured level, and expert systems at the 
unstructured level.  The user's input in the decision-making process relative to the 
decision aid's input increases from structured tasks to unstructured tasks. 
Deterministic decision aids are the type most commonly studied (Rose 2002).  
Examples include bankruptcy prediction and earnings forecast models.  These regression-
based models provide unbiased predictions based on inputs from a large set of positive 
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and negative test cases.  Moving toward unstructured tasks, decision support systems and 
expert systems increasingly become more intuitive, often using if-then and logic rules to 
arrive at recommendations.  Users should view the aid's recommendation as another input 
into their decision-making processes.  Even with deterministic decision aids, there exists 
the potential for “broken leg” cues (Meehl 1954) -- variables relevant to the situation but 
unaccounted for in the aid.  The true strength of decision aids lies in the combination of 
man and model (Kleinmuntz 1990; Arnold and Sutton 1997; Camerer and Johnson 1997; 
Ashton and Willingham 1988). 
 
Effects of Decision Aids 
Decision aids may have both positive and negative consequences (Ashton and 
Willingham 1988).  In addition to improvement in decisions, use of decision aids may 
improve learning (Eining and Dorr 1991; Rose 2002), although some studies question 
this finding (Murphy 1990; Glover et al. 1997).  Decision aids may also reduce cognitive 
effort (Sutton 1993; Brown and Eining 1996), freeing up cognitive resources.  Lowe and 
Reckers (1997) found aids could focus auditor attention, reduce hindsight effects, and 
increase the effectiveness of judgments.  Aids can also improve performance through task 
structuring.  For example, decision aids can assist in improving conditional probability 
judgments through decomposing and aggregating the judgment and “matching” users’ 
knowledge structures with task structures (Bonner et al. 1996), and can encourage 
superior choice strategies (Todd and Benbasat 1994). 
Decision aids may have unintended negative effects, with improvements in one 
area at the expense of other areas (Bonner 1999).  Ashton (1990) found the presence of 
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decision aids in environments where performance incentives were employed seemed to 
exert a pressure to perform that resulted in poorer performance.  Performance suffered, 
not because individuals relied or failed to rely on the aid, but merely because the aid was 
present.  Similarly, Boatsman et al. (1997) found the presence of an aid seemed to affect 
user decisions in negative ways.  In addition to ignoring the aid, they found purposeful 
shifting away from the aid’s advice and an increasing instance of this when the 
consequences of being wrong were increased.  Kachalmeier and Messier (1990) found 
evidence indicating that users sometimes “worked backwards.”  Users expended 
cognitive effort manipulating the inputs to the aid to arrive at their predetermined output, 
appearing to have relied on the aid.  Decision aids may also instill an unfounded 
confidence.  For example, Kotteman et al. (1994) found users of a what- if analysis 
decision aid exhibited higher confidence yet worse performance than non-users. 
Others suggest that prolonged use of decision aids will have potential long-term 
negative effects such as less expertise, less advancement of the profession, and a de-
skilling of accounting professionals (Sutton 1993; Arnold and Sutton 1998).  Arnold and 
Sutton (1998) note that in situations of high task complexity and low user task 
experience, the aid may become the primary basis, or even the sole basis, for the final 
decision.  This subjugation may have consequences beyond the current relegation of 
decisions to the aid.  They posit that it could lead to a generation of professionals unable 





Decision Aid Reliance 
Despite the proven performance superiority of decision aids over individuals in 
many tasks, there is a general tendency to avoid relying on the aid (Rose 2002).  
However, reliance is a key determinant of a decision aid's success (Whitecotten 1996).  
Generally, increased reliance leads to performance improvements, although there is the 
chance the aid does not take into account all relevant information.  A large amount of 
research has examined factors affecting reliance (Rose 2002).  For example, face validity, 
involvement in the aid’s development, and prior experience with the aid increased 
reliance (Brown and Eining 1997; Whitecotten and Butler 1998; Whitecotten 1996), 
while revealing the algorithm and decision framing had no effect on reliance (Brown and 
Jones 1998).  As users’ confidence in their abilities increase, reliance decreases 
(Whitecotten 1996; Arnold and Sutton 1998) and reliance may decrease when 
performance pressures are present (Ashton 1990; Boatsman et al. 1997). 
A common bond among decision aid reliance studies is the measurement of 
reliance.  Reliance is generally measured as agreement with the aid.  However, agreement 
with the aid may indicate something other than reliance, such as circumventing the aid, or 
“working backward,” as found by Kachalmeier and Messier (1990).  Reliance, as 
measured in these studies, does not necessarily capture whether the user relied on the aid 
nor whether they adopted the aid's recommendation in any capacity outside the final 
decision.  This lack of process information leaves a void in understanding the complete 
influence decision aids have on users. 
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While this shortcoming has been widely noted, little has been done to address it 
(Rose 2002; Brown and Eining 1997; Whitecotten and Butler 1998).  The influence 
decision aids may have on the decision-making process goes beyond the final outcome or 
decision made.  The decision aid may have an effect on the decision processes employed 
without being manifested in the outcome.  In other words, users may incorporate the aid 
into their decision processes but may not agree with the aid.  The lack of an underlying 
theory or explanation of decision aid reliance is one indication of the need for additional 
research in the area.  While models do exist (Brown and Jones 1998; Arnold and Sutton 
1998), they do not fit into a cohesive overall model.  Before such an endeavor can be 
realized, it will be necessary to more fully understand the decision processes influenced 
by the aid and determine how to appropriately measure reliance (Rose 2002). 
 
Summary 
While numerous studies have examined how decision aids affect decision 
outcomes and users’ behaviors toward the task, few have directly examined how decision 
aids affect users’ decision processes (Brown and Eining 1997).  The lack of process 
studies makes it impossible to model decision processes in aided environments or to fully 
understand the effects of decision aids on users and decision outcomes.  While research 
has provided both positive and negative support for decision aids, other potential 
consequences have yet to be examined.  One unexplored possibility is if and how 
decision aids may affect the inputs to decision-making, particularly the user’s memory.  
In addition, other decision processes possibly affected by the aid, such as information 
search, have yet to be considered.  It is possible that decision aids implemented to help 
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overcome deficiencies in certain decision processes may themselves be the cause of 
errors and bias in inputs and other decision processes. 
 
Information and Cognitive Load 
Certain tasks and environments tend to exacerbate the limitations and biases 
inherent in individual decision-making.  Complexity Theory (Streufert and Castore 1971) 
proposes two kinds of complexity that have the potential to affect behavior: individual 
differences in conceptual structure and environmental complexity.  In addition to the 
content of information, environmental complexity includes the amount of information, or 
information load.  Information processing involves combining and integrating 
informational cues.  This process requires the use of working memory -- the "workspace" 
within memory, which is separate from long-term memory and responsible for temporary 
storage and information processing (Newel and Simon 1972; Baddeley 1992; Richardson 
1996).  As working memory is very limited in size (Miller 1956; Baddeley 1992), an 
individual can only handle a limited amount of information at any one time. 
Schick et al. (1990) define information load as a function of user attention and 
time pressure rather than the amount of information provided.  This description fits the 
definition of a similar construct: cognitive load.  Cognitive load refers to the burden 
placed on working memory when completing a task (Sweller 1999).  Reductions in the 
amount of working memory available for processing information due to cognitive load 
should have the same effect as overloading working memory with information. 
Due to human limitations, increases in information or cognitive load can have 
deleterious effects on an already imperfect setting (Kanaan 1993).  Increases in 
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information load decrease decision quality (Chervany and Dickson 1974; Iselin 1993; 
Shields 1983; Helgeson and Ursic 1993; Hwang and Lin 1999), increase time spent on 
the task (Casey 1980; Iselin 1989; Iselin 1990; Helgeson and Ursic 1993), decrease 
information processing ability (Simnett 1996), and affect search strategies (Shields 1980; 
Ford et al. 1989).  Increased information load also decreases search (Streufert et al. 1965; 
Swain and Haka 2000), increases search variability (Cook 1993; Shields 1980; Swain and 
Haka 2000), and causes one to shift from compensatory to non-compensatory search 
strategies (Swain and Haka 2000; Cook 1993). 
As proposed by Kida and Smith (1995), Roberts and Rose (2002) examined 
whether increased information load resulted in greater reliance on affective responses.  
Their results suggest that memories for numerical values rapidly disappear as information 
load increases, while affective responses appear to be essentially immune to increases in 
load.  Similar to Hulland and Kleinmuntz (1994), who found that increased search costs 
lead to greater reliance on summary evaluations, decision-makers may rely on affective 
responses rather than the numerical data itself to cope with increased information load. 
Cognitive load has not been as widely examined but appears to have a similar 
effect.  Results support the notion that cognitive load consumes an individual’s working 
memory (Sweller 1999).  Increased cognitive load can be detrimental to learning (Sweller 
1999; Baddeley et al. 1984), lead to a greater reliance on stereotypes, cause a greater 
instance of anchoring, and lead to an increased inability to adequately adjust from an 
initial anchor (Roch et al. 2000).  Speier et al. (1999) found interruptions in complex 
tasks, a form of cognitive load, decreased performance and increased decision time.  
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Roberts and Rose’s (2002) initial findings suggest that increased cognitive loads also lead 
to increased reliance on affective responses. 
Research has explored techniques to overcome the negative effects of increased 
load.  Numerous studies have found presentation format to minimize negative effects of 
information overload (Bergstrom and Stoll 1990; Chervany and Dickson 1974; Stone and 
Schkade 1991; Stocks and Tuttle 1998).  Increased involvement may also overcome some 
of the effects of increased information (Hahn et al. 1992).  Others have suggested that 
one can learn to process higher loads through task learning (Iselin 1989), training 
(Harvey et al. 1961; Schroder et al. 1967), or improved ways of thinking (Schick et al. 
1990).  However, the use of decision aids is particularly appealing. 
It is precisely in high load situations where decision aids may be of greatest 
assistance and benefit (Gadenne and Iselin 2000).  As load increases, individual 
performance tends to decrease.  Decision aids are designed to reduce cognitive burdens 
and perform tasks that are difficult for individuals.  As a result, decision aids should be 
able to offer the most improvement in high load environments and are often employed in 
these environments.  However, these situations may also be where individuals are prone 
to rely on affective responses.  The possibility exists for the decision aid itself to have 
unintended negative consequences due to the very environment which promotes its use.  
An unexplored issue concerns the potential for the decision aid to create a strong 




Effect of Decision Aid Recommendations on Decision-making 
While Kida et al. (1998) found affective responses resulted from numerical data, 
there are other potential sources of affective responses.  Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) 
Elaboration Likelihood Model posits that persuasion may come from actual data or from 
“peripheral” cues outside the data.  For decision-makers inexperienced in a task, 
peripheral cues are often the basis of the attitude toward the message more so than is the 
actual data.  Based on Petty and Cacioppo’s model, Rose (2001) examined the effect of 
multimedia financial disclosures on affect.  He found decision-makers were affected by 
peripheral multimedia, unrelated to and even inconsistent with the numerical data.  
Despite the financial data clearly indicating the superiority of alternate choices, subjects 
reconstructed memories of financial data to match the media-induced affective response 
and made investment choices consistent with affective responses to the multimedia.  Kida 
et al. (2001) demonstrated managers’ tendency to reject decision alternatives that elicited 
a negative affective response (based on something unrelated to the financial data) even 
though the alternatives had higher expected values in a financial sense. 
While Kida and Smith (1995) suggest decision aids as one way of combating the 
prevalence of affect and directing decision-makers to focus on the numerical data, 
perhaps the decision aid itself may be the cause of an affective response.  This is 
especially likely because of the tendency to employ decision aids in high load situations, 
and high load situations lead to increased reliance on affective responses.  Just as data 
and peripheral cues can lead to creating an affective response that is used in decision-
making, the decision aid recommendation itself may cause an affective response.  Indeed, 
the deterministic aids essentially take a number of cues and arrive at an overall 
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evaluative, or affective, response.  The implication is that decision aids may create a 
strong response that does not take into account all relevant cues and may conflict with an 
optimal evaluation of the available data. 
It is expected that decision-makers will form an affective response based on the 
aid recommendation.  Consistent with the findings of Kida et al. (1998; 2001) and Rose 
(2001), the affective response generated by the aid recommendation is expected to be 
stronger than the numerical data.  The affective response will dominate judgments even 
when it is inconsistent with the numerical data.  Decision-makers will encode the 
affective response in memory, reconstruct memories for financial data to match the 
affective response, and use the affective response as an input in their decision-making 
processes.  When numerical data indicate an evaluative response inconsistent with the 
decision aid recommendation, it is expected the affective response generated by the aid 
recommendation will influence the user and subsequent decision processes.  Individual 
and task differences will moderate the effect the affective responses will have on users’ 
decision processes.  Figure 1 presents the model depicting the relevant constructs and 
expectations (all figures and tables are located in the Appendix). 
 
Effect of Decision Aid Recommendations on Memory 
Prior research in psychology of mood and memory has focused on learning and 
recall.  Mood can cause selective learning, or mood-congruent learning, with greater 
encoding of information matching the mood of the individual at the time of exposure 
(Bower 1981; Bower et al. 1981; Isen 1984).  Bower (1981) notes that mood has been 
found to affect the salience of mood-congruous material.  In recall, positive moods result 
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in greater retrieval of positive cues relative to negative cues and vice versa (Sinclair 
1988; Isen 1984; Petty et al. 1993).  Kida and Smith’s (1995) model proposes that 
affective responses to financial data are more persistent in memory than are the financial 
data themselves and may act as a mood state facilitating mood-congruent recall.  Kida et 
al. (1998, 2001) and Rose (2001) provide support for this proposition.  It is expected that 
the decision aid recommendation will create an affective response.  As in Kida et al. 
(1998) and Rose (2001), the affective response, rather than the numerical data, will be 
encoded in memory and will cause memories for the numerical data to be reconstructed 
to match the affective response.  This leads to the first hypothesis: 
H1: Decision-makers using a decision aid will reconstruct memory for financial 
data to match the affective response induced by the aid recommendation. 
 
 
Effect of Decision Aid Recommendations on Information Search and Cue Usage 
Despite the extensive number of studies examining search behavior, no one model 
explaining the role of information search in decision-making has emerged.  This current 
study extends information search research by exploring the role of decision aids on 
search behavior.  While decision aids have been suggested to provide direction to 
information search (Bouwman et al. 1987), unintended consequences might arise from 
their use.  Additionally, the study will extend research on cue usage focusing on the 
effects of task structure on cue usage and exploring why individuals choose specific cues.  
Specifically, this study will investigate the effects of a decision aid recommendation on 
cue selection and integration.  The decision aid recommendation itself may influence 
information search and cue usage.  Two literatures provide support for this hypothesis.  
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Research in psychology suggests moods have an effect on decision processes.  As 
previously discussed, affective responses to data are a form of mood state.  If the decision 
aid recommendation induces an affective response, this affective response can affect 
decision processes.  Research in accounting suggests individuals tend to seek to confirm 
their initial hypothesis (Klayman and Ha 1987; Danos et al. 1989).  The affective 
response generated by the decision aid recommendation may be the basis for the initial 
hypothesis, with users then exhibiting confirmatory behavior. 
 
Effect of Mood on Decision Processes 
There is a long record of research in psychology on the effects of mood (a.k.a. 
affect) on decision processes.  Mood is defined as feelings or emotions.  This research 
finds evidence that mood can have powerful effects on the cognitive processes and 
performance of individuals and that changes in mood affect subjects’ processing 
strategies (Hirt et al. 1997; Bower 1981).  While there is general agreement that decision-
making does not follow rational patterns as prescribed by normative models, Etzioni 
(1988) additionally argues that most choices are of an emotional and affective nature to 
the exclusion of true information processing, and logical and empirical cues are 
themselves really manifestations of affective responses when used.  Other research on 
affect shows that different affective states can lead to differential problem solving 
strategies and information processing.  Tenopir et al. (1991) found search strategies 
differed according to the searcher’s affective goals in a search task involving searching a 
database of online magazines with novice searchers. 
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While Kida and Smith’s (1995) model defines affect as an evaluative form in 
response to data rather than as an individual's emotion or feeling state, Rose (2001) 
provides support that this type of affect maps into the notion of affect used in psychology.  
His results found affective responses encoded in memory and used as inputs to financial 
decision-making could be driven by something totally unrelated to the data.  He found 
that affect induced by peripheral cues, specifically, happy and sad multimedia video 
clips, led to affective response driven decision-making.  Along the same line, Kida et al. 
(2001) demonstrated that affective responses could be generated by information about the 
participants in a task. 
 
Confirmation Bias 
Accounting research provides evidence that individuals tend to seek evidence that 
supports their initial hypothesis (Klayman and Ha 1987; Danos et al. 1989).  Despite the 
scientific advantage of seeking disconfirming evidence to test a hypothesis, people are 
prone to selectively remember information consistent with the hypothesis (Harris 1981).  
While evidence against confirmation bias exists in accounting and auditing settings 
(Ashton and Ashton 1988; Arnold 1997; Church 1990; Kida 1984; Smith and Kida 1991), 
findings suggest that novices are more prone to confirmation bias (Bonner and 
Pennington 1991; Kaplan and Reckers 1989).  This provides initial support for the notion 
that novice decision-makers, the individuals likely to be assisted by deterministic 
decision aids, would exhibit a confirmation bias. 
What is unclear is whether the decision aid recommendation provides an initial 
hypothesis different from what would exist in the absence of an aid.  However, research 
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provides support for this argument.  Dukerich and Nichols (1991) found search affected 
by the implication of a single cause in the problem description.  Just as an explanation of 
a hypothetical outcome makes that outcome appear more likely to occur in the future 
(Sherman et al. 1983), Swinney (1993, 1995) found that negative expert system 
explanations caused users to perceive greater likelihood that an event would occur.  Hoch 
and Schkade's (1996) results provide support that providing a decision aid may allow 
decision-makers to form an initial anchor.  Finally, Kowalczyk and Wolfe (1998) found 
that an expert system recommendation did cause an anchor effect that persisted even in 
light of contrary evidence. 
When the affective response generated by the aid recommendation is stronger 
than the numerical data, the decision aid recommendation becomes the basis for the 
initial anchor.  As previous research suggests, initial belief may affect search strategy 
with the tendency to confirm.  For the same reason, the choice of information (cue usage) 
will be consistent with the initial hypothesis.  This leads to the second hypothesis: 
H2: Decision-makers using a decision aid will exhibit search patterns and cue 
usage patterns influenced by the decision aid recommendation. 
 
H2a: Decision-makers using a decision aid will search more positive 
(negative) information when the decision aid's recommendation is positive 
(negative). 
 
H2b: Decision-makers using a decision aid will rank positive (negative) 
information cues as more important than negative (positive) cues when the 





Timing of the Decision Aid Recommendation 
A decision aid may be introduced into the decision-making process at any point 
prior to final judgment.  The effect on the decision processes and behavior of the user can 
be expected to vary dependent on when the aid recommendation is received.  It is 
expected that providing aid recommendations early in the decision-making process will 
subsequently affect search and cue usage, but will not cause memory reconstruction.  By 
providing or influencing the formation of an initial anchor, the aid recommendation will 
bias subsequent behavior.  Confirmation bias will affect search and cue usage.  However, 
memory cannot be altered because no memory traces exist at this point.   
On the other hand, receiving the recommendation late in the decision-making 
process is expected to affect memory and cause reconstruction effects, but not decision 
processes.  When the aid recommendation creates a strong affective response, the aid 
recommendation is expected to cause an affective response that is more durable than 
previous memory traces, essentially overriding any existing memory traces.  Due to its 
greater ease in retrieval, this affective response will be retrieved from memory, with users 
reconstructing memories to match the aid recommendation- induced affective response.  
However, providing the aid at the end of the decision-making process leaves no 
opportunity for the aid to influence search or cue usage.  This leads to the third 
hypothesis: 
H3: The time at which the decision aid's recommendation is introduced will affect 
the level of influence the decision aid recommendation has on the decision-






H3a: Decision-makers receiving the decision aid’s recommendation early 
in the decision-making process will exhibit less memory reconstruction 
effects than those receiving the aid’s recommendation late in the decision-
making process. 
 
H3b: Decision-makers receiving the decision aid’s recommendation early 
in the decision-making process will exhibit search patterns different from 
those receiving the aid’s recommendation late in the decision-making 
process. 
 
H3c: Decision-makers receiving the decision aid's recommendation early 
in the decision-making process will exhibit cue usage patterns different 




Effect of Decision Aid Recommendations on Final Judgment 
The literature on anchoring and adjustment has established that people are prone 
to adopt an initial anchor and make adjustments to the anchor to arrive at a decision.  
These adjustments, however, tend to be insufficient, and final decisions are biased toward 
the initial anchor even in light of overwhelming evidence contrary to that which caused 
the initial anchor (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Smith and Kida 1991; Ashton and 
Ashton 1988; Arnold 1997).  Anderson et al. (1980) found that subjects failed to make 
appropriate revisions to their beliefs even after the initial evidence leading to individuals’ 
beliefs were totally discredited; this occurred even when the evidence leading to the 
initial belief was weak at best.  Thus, decisions are often a function of the first 
information encountered (Arnold 1997), whether or not that first information is valid. 
How and where individuals actually set their initial anchor can vary.  Decision aid 
design has been proposed to mitigate the negative effects of anchoring and adjustment 
(Arnold and Sutton 1997).  However, as noted above, limited research suggests that the 
 
 30 
decision aid recommendation, by providing a solution or recommendation, may influence 
or create the initial anchor (Hoch and Schkade 1996; Swinney 1993, 1995; Kowalczyk 
and Wolfe 1998). 
The decision aid recommendation is expected to provide an initial hypothesis or 
anchor.  This is expected to lead to confirmatory search and cue usage as well as bias in 
memory.  This direct influence on the decision processes will indirectly affect the 
outcome, the final judgment.  The user's final judgment is expected to adhere closer to the 
aid recommendation than would be expected in the absence of an aid.  Adjustments from 
the anchor will not be sufficient with the final judgment biased toward the aid- influenced 
anchor.  This leads to the fourth hypothesis: 
H4: Decision-makers using a decision aid will reach more positive (negative) 




Effect of Working Memory Capacity on Memory and Decision Processes 
In judgment and decision-making research, individual differences can affect 
decision-making.  For example, cognitive styles have been found to be an important 
determinant of decision-making (Chan 1995).  Individuals differ in their cognitive make-
up in numerous ways.  One individual difference that should moderate the relationship 
between aid recommendations and decision processes is working memory capacity.  
Working memory is the construct that refers to the system underlying the maintenance of 
task-relevant information during the performance of a cognitive task (Miyake and Shah 
1999).  It is the “workspace” within memory, separate from long-term memory, 
responsible for temporary storage and information processing (Newel and Simon 1972; 
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Baddeley 1992; Richardson 1996).  A variety of models have been proposed to articulate 
the conceptual structure of working memory within human memory (Miyake and Shah 
1999).  General agreement among these models is that working memory is of very 
limited capacity, this limited capacity is central to the limitations individuals encounter in 
information processing, and individuals differ in their working memory capacities (Miller 
1956; Baddeley 1992; Engle 1996). 
In cognitive psychology, individual differences in working memory capacities 
have received a great deal of attention (Klein and Fiss 1999).  Working memory capacity 
is a relatively stable individual difference that is related to performance on a variety of 
cognitive tasks (Klein and Fiss 1999; Baddeley 1992; Anderson 1995; Engle 1996).  For 
example, individuals with higher working memory capacities have better global 
comprehension, better memory for specific details, are better at following directions 
(Engle 1996), make optional elaborative inferences (St. George et al. 1997), and are 
better at suppressing and enhancing responses (Rosen 1996; Rosen and Engle 1998). 
 Research examining working memory capacity’s effect on memory primarily 
examine encoding and retrieval.  Encoding and retrieval appear to require resources 
under the participant's control (Naveh-Benjamin et al. 2000; Conway and Engle 1994).  
Constraints on working memory capacity or controlled attention, caused by either 
individual differences in capacity or by the addition of cognitive load, profoundly 
influence retrieval (Baddeley et al. 1984; Rosen and Engle 1997).  In general, subjects 
with greater working memory capacities have more attentional resources to draw upon 
than do subjects with lower capacities, independent of the task involved (Conway and 
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Engle 1996).  Therefore, differences in working memory capacities may result in 
differential effects on tasks requiring memory. 
Working memory's limited capacity restricts the amount of data that can be 
considered simultaneously (Libby 1981), and poor integration performance is often due 
to limits in working memory capacity.  St. George et al.’s (1997) results regarding 
elaborative inferences suggest that limited working memory hinders activities requiring 
the combination of cues both current and prior.  Based on Just and Carpenter’s (1992) 
Capacity Constrained Comprehension model, limits in the working memory capacity of 
individuals hinder the ability to make necessary inferences in reading. 
While St. George et al.’s results are based on reading tasks, their findings reflect 
outcomes that can be expected in financ ial data analysis tasks.  In fact, Kida and Smith 
(1995) suggest that individuals' limited working memory capacities may be a cause of the 
tendency to rely on affect.  Individuals may rely on summary evaluations in an attempt to 
conserve limited cognitive resources (Hulland and Kleinmuntz 1994).  If individuals with 
low working memory capacities rely more on affect, then the affective response created 
by a decision aid’s recommendation can be expected to exert more influence on users 
with lower working memory capacities. 
Essentially no research in accounting has examined the construct of working 
memory, despite its intuitive and theoretical appeal.  Preliminary results of one study 
found that decision-makers’ working memory capacities were determinants of their 
abilities to recall numerical data (Roberts and Rose 2002).  Subjects with higher working 
memory capacities were able to recall significantly more numerical data than were 
subjects with lower working memory capacities.  Interestingly, working memory capacity 
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was not significant in recall of affective responses, suggesting that the memory 
mechanisms for storing and retrieving affect are less sensitive to working memory 
capacity than they are to other memory mechanisms.  This leads to the fifth hypothesis : 
H5: Decision-makers’ working memory capacities will be negatively associated 
with the amount of influence the decision aid has on their decision-making 
processes. 
 
H5a: There will be a negative association between decision-makers’ 
working memory capacity and memory reconstruction effects. 
 
H5b: There will be a negative association between decision-makers’ 





 In summary, individuals may perform poorly when forming judgments and 
making decisions for a number of reasons.  Poor inputs and/or poor processing are 
potential causes for poor decision-making.  Decision aids may help overcome poor 
integration ability and are especially helpful in environments where decision tasks 
involve heavy information and cognitive loads.  Indeed, decision aids can outperform 
people in many predictive tasks.  However, in high load environments, people tend to 
rely on affective responses rather than numerical data.  There is a great potential for 
decision aids to create affective responses and influence users’ memory and behavior.  
The lack of process information in current studies has resulted in a failure to depict if and 
how the decision aid is actually incorporated into the users’ decision-making process.  
Understanding the true impact of the decision aid on users’ decision processes is 
necessary to model financial decision-making processes in aided environments.  Further, 
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modeling the decision process in aided environments is essential to appropriate decision 
aid design and implementation. 
It is expected that decision aid recommendations will create affective responses 
that will be encoded in memory and will affect users’ memory patterns, information 
search strategies, cue usage, and judgments.  Further, it is expected that these effects will 
be dependent upon the timing of the aid recommendation.  When the aid’s 
recommendation is received early in the decision process, it is expected that information 
search patterns, cue usage, and judgments will change.  When the aid recommendation is 
received near the end of the decision process, however, memory reconstruction effects 








Two experiments were conducted to investigate how decision aid 
recommendations are incorporated into users’ decision-making processes.  Specifically, 
the study focuses on the effect of decision aid recommendations on users’ memories, 
information searches, cue usages, and judgments.  Further, the effect of the timing of the 
decision aid recommendation on these decision processes is examined. 
 
Experimental Task 
The experimental task is an assessment of the likelihood of future financial 
problems for a firm (adapted from Kida et al. (1998)).  The task involves examining a set 
of 14 financial statement ratios with prior year or industry comparative data.  Subjects 
also examine a decision aid recommendation (except for a control group) and search 
additional information based on a subject-chosen subset of the financial ratios.  
Likelihood assessments of this nature are made in a variety of settings, from investment 
analysis to going-concern evaluations in auditing.  Therefore, results may be 
generalizable to several tasks and environments rather than limited to a highly specific 
setting.   
The analysis of financial ratios employed in this task is used in numerous settings, 
from fundamental analysis to analytical review procedures.  While there are no 
authoritative mandates on the approach to analytical review procedures, SSARS No. 1 
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and SAS No. 23 both provide some direction on approaching the procedure, including 
comparison of current amounts with prior periods and industry-similar amounts 
(Mancuso 1992).  Likewise, the availability and use of a decision aid in this type of 
environment and for this type of task is plausible.  Decision aid use in practice is 
widespread (Ashton and Willingham 1988; Rose 2002).  Audit programs, checklists, 
sample size formulas, and expert systems are a few of the decision aids auditors employ.  
Investment analysts use decision aids such as spreadsheets and regression models.  The 
task, the information set, and the subjects (discussed next) fit well with the environment 
the study is emulating, the use of a decision aid in a deterministic task by novices. 
 
Subjects 
For experiment one, subjects were junior and senior accounting students enrolled 
in an accounting information systems course at the University of Tennessee in the Fall of 
2001 who had the required background in financial statement analysis.  For experiment 
two, subjects were University of Tennessee students enrolled in an undergraduate 
auditing class, Masters of Accounting students at the University of Tennessee and 
Appalachian State University, and MBA students at Appalachian State University and 
Seattle Pacific University. 
Student subjects are preferred for two primary reasons.  First, the subject of 
interest is a novice financial decision-maker in a high information load environment.  
Students have experience levels more closely matched to the experience levels of novice 
financial decision-makers than would professionals.  While newly hired financial analysts 
might be preferable to students, students provide a convenient sample.  In addition, the 
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majority of subjects reported having accounting work experience of at least one year, 
suggesting they are reasonable surrogates for novice financial decision-makers.  Second, 
experience and prior knowledge has been shown to affect decision aid use, search 
strategies and search effectiveness, and the ability to handle large information loads 
(Cloyd 1995; Spilker 1995; Salterio 1996; Spilker and Prawitt 1997; Hunton and 
McEwen 1997; Iselin 1996).  Further, Moeckel (1990) found experienced subjects tended 
to reconstruct more from prior memories held in their long-term memory but found no 
reconstruction effects with novices.  Therefore, the use of students also acts as a control 
by providing a relatively homogenous subject pool in terms of prior knowledge 
differences and experience. 
To motivate effort during the task, subjects participated as a class exercise with 
course credit assigned for successful completion of the exercise.  Further, subjects were 
told that monetary awards would be distributed to those performing in the top ten 
percentile.  While performance was based on a particular aspect of the task (the memory 
task), subjects were not told the details of the performance-based compensation in order 
to promote effort during all phases of the experiment.  To further motivate effort, subjects 
were told that another ten percent of subjects successfully completing the experiment 
would be randomly chosen to receive monetary awards. 
 
Pilot Tests 
Pilot tests were conducted to ensure the appropriateness of the task and 
experimental materials.  Five accounting doctoral students and 15 undergraduate 
accounting students from the University of Tennessee participated in the pilot test.  
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Subjects were paid a base amount for completing the pilot instrument and were further 
motivated by additional performance-based compensation to top performers. 
The ratio set used was adapted from the second experiment in Kida et al. (1998).  
The ratios used in Kida et al. were constructed to cause a strong overall unfavorable 
evaluation of the firm.  The design of this study requires an overall neutral data set, with 
half of the ratios conveying moderately unfavorable impressions and half conveying 
moderately favorable impressions.  As such, the firm and comparative ratio values were 
changed slightly to achieve an overall neutral reaction.  Results of the pilot test confirmed 
that the intended effect was achieved. 
Pilot tests also provided support that the additional information provided in the 
search procedure met three criteria: 1) subjects believed that the additional information 
added value to the assessment judgment, thus motivating search; 2) the additional 
information did not direct subsequent search choices; and 3) the additional information 
was of the same relative affective nature as the financial ratios alone.  Comprehension of 
the decision aid recommendation and face validity of the decision aid were also validated. 
 
Experimental Procedures 
The study consists of two separate experiments.  Experiment one assesses the 
effect of decision aids on users’ memories, cue usages, and judgments (but not search).  
Experiment two is identical to experiment one except for the addition of search.  The 
inclusion of search in experiment two introduces the possibility that results found for 
memory reconstruction and judgments may be due to differences in search patterns rather 
than the direct influence of the aid.  Therefore, experiment one’s primary purpose is to 
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provide support for hypotheses one and four and rule out alternate hypotheses related to 
the effect that search may have on memories and judgments.  Additionally, experiment 
one ensures the validity of the experimental materials used in experiment two. 
 
Experiment One 
For experiment one, subjects completed the experiment in their normal classroom 
under the supervision of the experimenter.  A series of seven envelopes containing the 
various parts of the instrument were presented in a timed and sequential manner.  Each 
part of the experiment was timed to allow adequate time to complete the task and 
eliminate the possibility that effects were due to differences in the time taken to complete 
the exercise. 
The instrument consists of basic introductory information, a set of 14 financial 
ratios with comparative prior year or industry average information, a decision aid 
recommendation, a place to indicate likelihood assessments, demographic questions and 
manipulation checks, a memory reconstruction task, and a task to measure working 
memory capacity. 
The experimental procedures followed one of two sequences as depicted in Figure 
3.  Timing of the aid recommendation, early or late, was crossed with one of two types of 
decision aid recommendation, positive or negative, yielding a 2 x 2 between-subjects 
design.  Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental treatments.  
The materials in each sequence are identical, only the ordering is varied.  Therefore, only 
the late introduction sequence is described. 
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Subjects were given a brief verbal description of the exercise they would be 
completing after receiving a paper-clipped stack of seven numbered envelopes containing 
the sequenced experimental materials.  Subjects were then directed to open the first 
envelope containing introductory instructions explaining the nature of the task.  Sufficient 
time was given to read the instructions. 
Upon returning the instructions to envelope one, subjects opened envelope two.  
Envelope two contained a set of 14 current year financial ratios with comparative 
information, either the prior year’s ratio for the firm or the industry average ratio value.  
Subjects were allowed ten minutes to scrutinize the data.  They were not allowed to move 
on to the next envelope before the ten minutes expired.  This was done to allow adequate 
consideration of the information and effort toward the task.  The financial ratios used are 
adapted from Kida et al.’s (1998) second experiment and are constructed to yield an 
overall neutral evaluation of the firm.  To insure correct interpretation of the ratios given, 
a supplementary sheet containing a brief description of what each ratio indicates and how 
each ratio is calculated was provided.  A primary purpose of the ratio analysis phase was 
to allow subjects the opportunity to encode into memory information about the firm, 
allowing tests of the influence of affective responses on memories and judgments. 
At the end of the ten minutes, subjects returned the materials to envelope two and 
were instructed to open envelope three.  Envelope three provided a place for subjects to 
enter their likelihood assessments and indicate their levels of confidence in their 
judgments. 
Once all assessments had been recorded and returned to envelope three, subjects 
opened envelope four containing an explanation of the decision aid and the 
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recommendation given by the aid.  The aid is described as a regression model developed 
with ratio data from a large number of firms (some of which had experienced financial 
problems and some of which had not).  Further, the aid is said to use a subset of the 14 
ratios as its input.  This is done to emulate a situation where the decision aid is just one of 
other cues to be used to arrive at a judgment.  Manipulation of the type of decision aid 
recommendation (positive or negative), while holding the numerical data constant, allows 
examination and hypothesis testing of the effect that the recommendation has on users’ 
memories and judgments.  As such, the aid recommendation provided is not truly the 
output of a valid regression model.  The form of the decision aid recommendation is an 
indication of the likelihood the firm will experience financial problems within the 
foreseeable future with three possibilities: a LOW, MEDIUM, or HIGH likelihood.  
Subjects in the positive aid recommendation treatments received a LOW likelihood 
probability, while subjects in the negative aid treatments received a HIGH likelihood 
probability.  Historical prediction accuracy is provided to offer face validity to the aid. 
Subjects returned the decision aid information to envelope four and opened 
envelope five.  Envelope five provided a place for subjects to record their final likelihood 
assessments and indicate their levels of confidence in their assessments.  The materials 
were returned to envelope five and subjects then opened and completed a series of 
demographic questions and manipulation checks contained in envelope six. 
Upon returning the materials to envelope six, subjects completed a task designed 
to capture their working memory capacities.  The operation-word span task (derived from 
LaPointe and Engle (1990)), used extensively in psychology research, is a well-accepted 
measure of an individual’s working memory.  Span tasks are designed to resemble the 
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working memory demands during the performance of complex cognitive tasks by placing 
simultaneous demands on both processing and storage (Miyake and Shah 1999).  
Measures captured here are used to test hypothesis five.  Designed for individual 
administration, the operation-word span task was adapted for administration to a large 
group.  The group administration is discussed with deviations from single-person 
administration noted in parentheses.  The task consists of a series of simple arithmetic 
operations with an answer followed by a one-syllable word, such as “(4x3)+1=14 sword.”  
Each operation and accompanying word is presented simultaneously one operation-word 
pair at a time on an overhead projector for a short period of time (rather than on an 
individual’s computer screen).  Subjects indicate whether the answer following the 
operation is correct or incorrect in a booklet and then attempt to remember the word 
following the operation (rather than verbally expressing the correctness of the operation 
and saying the word out loud).  After a brief interval, the experimenter moves on to the 
next operation-word pair.  After varying sets of two to seven operations, a question mark 
appears on the screen prompting subjects to write down as many of the words from the 
previous set as they can remember.  Three sequences of each set size are presented in 
random order.  Approximately half the operations are correct; half are incorrect. 
The task is scored to achieve two span scores: a set-size memory score and a total 
memory span.  Set-size memory is the maximum set size where the subject correctly 
recalled all the words in two out of the three times that set size was presented.  Total 
memory span is the sum of the number of correctly recalled words recalled in any order.  
Words are deemed correctly recalled only when the associated operation is correctly 
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indicated as being correct or incorrect, keeping subjects from focusing entirely on 
remembering the words. 
Klein and Fiss (1999) examined the reliability of the operation-word span task 
and found alpha coefficients greater than .75 in a series of test-retests.  However, the 
types of subjects used in most psychology studies were of a different ability and general 
demeanor than the average accounting student.  An initial pilot study deemed the task 
rather unsuccessful in discriminating subjects with above average mathematical ability.  
From observing subjects completing the task, it appeared that the simplicity of the 
mathematical operations and the amount of time allowed for each operation-word pair did 
not place significant demands on subjects’ processing and storage functions.  Therefore, 
the task was adapted to better reflect the abilities of accounting subjects.  Three 
adaptations were made.  First, the complexity of the operations was increased.  For 
example, “[(4x3)-(3x2)]+1=8 sword.”  Second, the time given for viewing each 
operation-word pair was reduced by 33 percent.  Last, the set sizes were changed to sets 
of three to eight with two of each set size.  A second pilot study on Masters of 
Accounting students supported success in taxing the abilities of these more numerically 
skilled individuals.  Observing subjects completing the task, it appeared that a significant 
burden on both processing and storage functions was achieved.  Table 1 presents the 
operation-word combinations used. 
Upon completion of the working memory task, subjects opened envelope seven, 
which contained a memory reconstruction task.  The memory reconstruction task is 
adapted from Kida et al. (1998).  It is designed to capture the extent to which memory is 
reconstructed to match the decision aid recommendation direction, either positive or 
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negative, to allow testing of hypothesis one.  The task consists of a series of statements 
with instructions directing subjects to indicate whether the statement was included in the 
original data set and their confidence in each determination.  Statements are of six types.  
Four statements are new items that have an affective response consistent with the 
decision aid recommendation.  Four statements are new items that have an affective 
response inconsistent with the decision aid recommendation.  Two statements are items 
in the original data set that were originally inconsistent with the decision aid 
recommendation but whose values were changed to be consistent with the 
recommendation.  Two statements are items in the original data set that were originally 
consistent with the decision aid recommendation but whose values were changed to be 
inconsistent with the recommendation.  Three statements are items in the original data set 
exactly as they appeared and one probe statement is an item that was obviously not in the 
original data set.  These last four statements were included as attention checks to test 
whether subjects paid adequate attention to the task.  Reconstruction is exhibited when 
subjects believe that new items consistent with the decision aid recommendation and 
items originally inconsistent with the decision aid recommendation but changed to be 
consistent were included in the original data set. 
 
Experiment Two 
Experiment two is similar to experiment one with three exceptions.  First, 
experiment two was administered via the Internet using an interactive web-based 
database application developed with Cold Fusion.  Subjects completed the experiment in 
university computer labs under the supervision of the experimenter or an assistant.  This 
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facilitated both administration of the experiment and data collection.  Data were 
automatically collected during the experiment in a relational database tied to the web 
application.  This allowed the capturing of exact timing of individual subject behavior not 
possible with paper-based materials.  The design also allowed the examination of search 
in a much more realistic and less obtrusive manner than would the use of information 
boards or other more primitive process-tracing techniques.  Second, experiment two adds 
the ability to perform external information search during the task.  Third, experiment two 
does not include the working memory capacity task.  The addition of the search 
component extended the time necessary to complete the experiment to a level prohibiting 
the inclusion of the working memory capacity task as well. 
The experimental procedures followed one of three sequences as depicted in 
Figure 4.  Each timing of the aid, early, delayed, or late, was crossed with one of two 
types of decision aid recommendation, positive or negative, yielding a 3 x 2 between-
subjects design.  Additionally, there was a control group who received no aid.  Subjects 
were randomly assigned to one of the seven experimental treatments.  The experimental 
materials were identical to those of experiment one with the inclusion of additional 
information for each financial ratio from which the user could select a subset to view.  
Since only the ordering of materials varies, only the late introduction sequence is 
described. 
Upon arriving in a university computer lab, subjects were given a slip of paper 
with a web address and were given a brief verbal description of the exercise they would 
be completing.  Subjects were told to enter the web address into their web browsers and 
proceed as instructed on screen.  As in experiment one, subjects were provided 
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introductory instructions followed by the timed ratio analysis phase.  To insure correct 
interpretation of the ratios given, the presentation of the financial ratios included 
functionality whereby subjects could view a brief description on the screen of what each 
ratio indicates and how each ratio is calculated.  Likelihood assessments and confidence 
levels were then recorded. 
Next, subjects were informed they had the ability to search for additional 
information.  The financial ratios were provided once again, this time hyper- linked to 
provide access to some additional information.  The additional information included 
further comparative data, either prior year or industry average ratios, depending on what 
was available previously.  In addition, it also provided the firm’s relative ranking of each 
ratio within its group of direct competitors reported as being in the top, middle, or bottom 
third.  Subjects searched for additional information for six ratios.  This limited ability to 
search is indicative of practice where time and cost constraints prohibit exhaustive 
external search (Hulland and Kleinmuntz 1994).  The subjects then recorded revised 
likelihood assessments and indicated their levels of confidence in their judgments.  The 
search portion of the task allows tests and comparisons to be made of search patterns to 
determine the influence of decision aids and affective responses on search. 
Following the explanation of the decision aid and the aid recommendation, 
subjects provided final likelihood assessments and confidence levels.  Further, they 
ranked the top six ratios they believed to be most important in making their judgments.  
This provides data to test hypotheses related to cue usage.  This was followed by a series 
of demographic questions, manipulation checks, and miscellaneous questions.  These 
questions served the dual purpose of capturing needed information and acting as a 
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distracter task to clear subjects’ short-term working memories.  This portion of the task 
was timed and set at ten minutes.  Subjects were not allowed to continue to the next 
section until the time expired.  This was done to ensure everyone had the same amount of 
time between last viewing information and the memory task in an effort to insure equality 
in clearing subjects’ working memory.  Research on memory indicates only a few 
minutes are needed to completely clear working memory. 
Last, subjects completed the memory reconstruction task.  Subjects were then 
allowed to leave. 
 
Independent Variables 
The two independent variables manipulated are timing of the decision aid 
recommendation and the type of decision aid recommendation.  For experiment one, the 
decision aid recommendation is provided at one of two possible timings: 1) early – before 
viewing the financial ratios; and 2) late – after viewing the financial ratios.  For 
experiment two, the decision aid recommendation is provided at one of three possible 
timings: 1) early – before viewing the financial ratios or searching; 2) delayed – after 
viewing the financial ratios but before searching; and 3) late – after both viewing the 
financial ratios and searching.  See Figures 5a and 5b for a graphical depiction of the 
timing manipulation for both experiments.  The type of decision aid recommendation 
provided to subjects is one of two possible directions: 1) positive – a low likelihood the 
firm will experience financial problems in the foreseeable future, or 2) negative – a high 
likelihood the firm will experience financial problems in the foreseeable future. 
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In addition, working memory capacity is measured for each subject in experiment 
one.  The operation-word span task provides a span measure related to the capacity of an 
individual’s working memory.  The total memory span, which is the sum of the number 
of correctly recalled words recalled in any order, is used for this measure. 
 
Dependent Variables 
To examine memory reconstruction, the dependent variable is the extent of 
reconstruction.  Reconstruction is defined as the difference in the percentage of times 
users incorrectly identify new items consistent with the direction of the decision aid 
recommendation (New/Consistent) as being in the original data set and new items 
inconsistent with the direction of the decision aid recommendation (New/Inconsistent) as 
being in the original data set.  For search patterns, the dependent variable is the direction 
of search.  Direction of search captures the extent of the positive or negative valence of 
searched items.  This yields an index on a scale of –6 to +6 as favorable cues receive a 
value of +1 and unfavorable cues a value of –1.  This measure does not allow weighting 
of searched items.  Items searched first may have more importance than those searched 
last.  Therefore, a second measurement of search direction uses relative weights based on 
when during the six items searched each item was viewed in an attempt to capture the 
relative importance of searched items.  Items searched first receive a weight of six, items 
searched second receive a weight of five, and so on.  This yields a scale ranging from –21 
to +21.  For cue usage, the dependent variable is an index capturing the relative direction 
(positive or negative) of the cues deemed most important.  Two measures of cue usage 
are determined, using the same scoring procedures as used for search.  For judgments, the 
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dependent variables are the final likelihood assessment and the assessment revision, 






Experiment One  
 
Purpose 
The purpose of experiment one is to examine the effect of decision aids on 
memory patterns and judgments without the influence of information search (hypotheses 
one and two).  The effects of the type of decision aid recommendation (aid type) and the 
timing of the decision aid recommendation (aid timing) are both investigated.  In 
addition, working memory capacity is measured to determine its moderating influence on 
memory patterns and judgments (hypothesis five). 
 
Statistical Procedures 
The experimental plan is a two-factor completely randomized fixed-effects model.  
Hypotheses are tested using paired t-tests, Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), Analysis of 
Covariance (ANCOVA), and correlation analysis procedures. 
Hypothesis one posits that memory will be reconstructed to match a decision aid’s 
recommendation, whether positive or negative.  A paired t-test is employed to examine 
mean differences in memory patterns.  Specifically, I test for differences between positive 




Hypothesis four proposes that decision aid recommendations affect decision-
makers’ judgments.  An ANOVA model is used to examine the effect of the type of 
decision aid recommendation and timing of the decision aid recommendation on final 
assessments.  The dependent variable is the final assessment.  The fixed factors in the 
model are the type of decision aid recommendation and timing of the decision aid 
recommendation, and working memory capacity is included as a covariate. 
Finally, hypothesis five involves the effects of subjects’ working memory 
capacities on the level of influence decision aids have on decision processes.  I conduct 
correlation analysis to determine if there is a statistically significant relationship between 
subjects’ working memory capacities and the influence a decision aid has on memory 
patterns and judgments.  I then employ an ANOVA model with the difference between 
inaccurate New/Consistent identifications and inaccurate New/Inconsistent identifications 
as the dependent variable.  Fixed factors are the type of aid recommendation and timing 
of the aid recommendation, and working memory capacity is included as a covariate. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
A total of 64 subjects participated in experiment one.  Table 2 provides 
descriptive statistics on the subjects for experiment one.1  Several observations are 
noteworthy.  Overall, incorrect identification of New/Consistent items is higher than for 
New/Inconsistent items for both types of decision aid recommendations.  The type of aid 
recommendation appears to have an effect on the final assessment.  The mean final 
                                                                 
1 Data were analyzed for normality and to identify outliers.  Boxplots, histograms, and normal probability 
plots were examined.  No extreme outliers were noted and the hypothesis of normality was not rejected. 
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assessment for subjects receiving a negative aid recommendation is 68.9, while only 35.7 
for those receiving a positive aid recommendation.  While these initial observations 
appear to support the hypotheses, formal statistical tests will provide empirical support. 
 
Manipulation Checks 
In order to draw reliable conclusions from the hypotheses tests, it is necessary to 
verify that subjects correctly interpreted the intended manipulations, exerted adequate 
effort and attention to the task, and paid attention to the decision aid.  To insure the 
manipulation of the type of decision aid recommendation was correctly interpreted, a 
manipulation check was included in the instrument that required subjects to indicate 
whether the decision aid recommendation suggested the firm was likely to experience 
financial difficulty.  Mean levels of agreement/disagreement confirm the intended 
manipulation was achieved.  To determine whether subjects were paying adequate 
attention to the task, I included three items in the memory task that were in the original 
dataset and one new item that was obviously not in the original dataset.  Error rates on 
incorrect identification of these items were low (8.6%), indicating that subjects were able 
to recall original data items and recognize new data items.  Accurate recall indicates that 
subjects exerted effort during both the study and test phases.  Finally, two questions 
addressing the perceived credibility of the decision aid were provided.  Mean agreement 
levels for whether subjects believed that the decision aid was useful and reliable, based 
upon comparisons with the neutral position, indicate that the aid was perceived as being 
useful and credible.  These manipulation and attention checks provide support that 
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subjects understood the task, understood the information given them, and exerted effort 
during the task. 
 
Effect of Decision Aid Recommendations on Memory 
Hypothesis one predicts that decision-makers receiving a decision aid 
recommendation will reconstruct memory for financial data to match the affective 
response induced by the aid recommendation.  To test the hypothesis, a paired t-test is 
used to compare percentage of times New/Consistent items were identified as being in 
the original dataset with percentage of times New/Inconsistent items were identified as 
being in the original dataset.  A significantly greater identification of New/Consistent 
items (41.0%) as compared to New/Inconsistent items (7.4%) supports reconstruction of 
memory to match the decision aid recommendation.  The result of the paired t-test is 
highly significant (t = -9.514, n = 64, p<0.0001).  There are a significantly greater 
percentage of inaccurate New/Consistent identifications than inaccurate New/Inconsistent 
identifications.  This provides evidence in support of hypothesis one. 
 
Effect of Decision Aid Recommendations on Final Judgment 
Hypothesis four predicts that decision aid recommendations will influence the 
judgments of their users.  Specifically, it predicts that decision-makers using a decision 
aid will reach more positive (negative) final judgments when the aid's recommendation is 
positive (negative). 
Results of an ANOVA model with assessment bias as the dependent variable and 
the type of the aid recommendation and the timing of the aid recommendation as fixed 
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factors are presented in Table 3 Panel A.  Assessment bias is calculated as the final 
assessment less a neutral assessment of fifty.  This measure captures the amount and 
direction the final assessment deviates from a neutral assessment.2  Aid type is 
statistically significant at p<.0001, while aid timing is not.  Positive aid recommendations 
resulted in a mean final assessment of 35.7, while negative aid recommendations resulted 
in a mean final assessment of 68.9.  The direction of aid recommendation does influence 
the final judgment, specifically in the direction of the aid recommendation.  This provides 
evidence in support of hypothesis four. 
Further insight is gained by looking at the revision made to assessments, 
comparing the initial assessment to the final assessment.  Table 3 Panel B presents the 
results of the ANOVA model using assessment revision as the dependent measure (initial 
assessment minus final assessment) and the type of the aid recommendation and the 
timing of the aid recommendation as fixed factors.  Neither aid type nor aid timing is 
statistically significant, but the interaction effect of aid type and aid timing is statistically 
significant at p<0.0001.  Figures 6 and 7 present graphs of assessment revision and the 
change in assessments, respectively.  Unsurprisingly, it is clear that receiving the aid 
recommendation early results in a major bias in judgment, but that this bias is somewhat 
“neutralized” (but not completely) as additional information is acquired.  As would be 
expected, much reliance is placed on the decision aid in the absence of other information.  
Once other information is received, the decision-maker begins to rely on their own 
judgment as well, although not completely. 
                                                                 
2 This assumes that, on average, the final assessment resulting from examination of the data alone would be 
a neutral assessment.  The objective of the experiment was to present an overall neutral dataset that would 




Effect of Working Memory Capacity on Memory and Decision Processes 
Hypothesis five predicts that decision-makers’ working memory capacities will be 
a determinant of the amount of influence the decision aid has on their memory patterns 
and judgments.  Specifically, it proposes that there will be a negative association between 
decision-makers’ working memory capacity and both memory reconstruction effects and 
the influence of aid recommendations on judgments.  I first test hypothesis five by 
correlating subjects’ working memory span score with New/Consistent, 
New/Inconsistent, total number of items incorrect, and assessment bias.  Table 4 provides 
the results of the analysis.  There are significant negative correlations for all four 
combinations.  Subjects with increased working memory capacities tend to have 
significantly fewer incorrect identifications of New/Consistent and New/Inconsistent 
items, make fewer incorrect identifications overall, and make final judgments that are less 
influenced by the aid recommendation.  This provides preliminary support for hypotheses 
5a and 5b. 
To further investigate hypothesis 5a, subjects are classified into groups of high or 
low working memory capacity, partitioned by average span score.  Table 5 Panel A 
provides a comparison of mean error rates for New/Consistent items, New/Inconsistent 
items, and all errors for subjects of high and low working memory capacity.  Subjects 
with higher working memory capacities have lower error rates across all three categories.  
This suggests that working memory capacity is a determinant of overall memory, but not 
necessarily a determinant of the level of influence the aid recommendation will have on 
memory.  As an additional test, Table 5 Panel B presents the results of an ANOVA model 
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with the difference between inaccurate identification of New/Consistent items and 
New/Inconsistent items as the dependent variable.  Fixed factors are type of aid 
recommendation and timing of aid recommendation and working memory capacity is 
included as a covariate.  Working memory capacity is not statistically significant.  Taken 
together, this suggests that while subjects with lower working memory capacities are 
more susceptible to reconstruction they are also more susceptible to all other errors, or 
memory errors in general.  Therefore, hypothesis 5a is not supported. 
Hypothesis 5b is investigated by comparing assessment bias and revision in 
assessment for high and low working memory capacity groups.  Mean comparisons 
reveal that subjects with lower working memory capacities appear to have more bias in 
their assessments (mean of 4.78 compared to mean of –0.43) and tend to revise their 
assessments to a greater degree (mean of –8.37 compared to mean of 1.46).  Even though 
both results are in the expected direction, an independent samples t-test indicates that 
assessment bias is not significantly different but revision in assessment is significantly 
different at p = 0.063.  As an additional test, Panels A and B of Table 3 provide results of 
ANOVA models with assessment bias and revision in assessment, respectively, as 
dependent variables, and working memory capacity included as a covariate.  Working 
memory capacity is statistically significant in both models.  Working memory capacity is 
a statistically significant determinant of the amount of influence the aid recommendation 







Experiment two examines the effect of decision aids on memory patterns, 
information search, cue usage, and judgment. 
 
Statistical Procedures 
The experimental plan is a two-factor completely randomized fixed-effects model.  
Hypotheses are tested with paired t-tests, Repeated Measures, Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA), and Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) procedures. 
Hypothesis one posits that memory will be reconstructed to match a decision aid’s 
recommendation, whether positive or negative.  As in experiment one, I test hypothesis 
one with a paired t-test to examine mean differences in memory patterns.  Specifically, I 
test for differences between positive identification of New/Consistent items and positive 
identification of New/Inconsistent items.  Additionally, I employ a Repeated Measures 
ANOVA model.  This is a more powerful test as it allows for the additional examination 
that the effect the type of aid recommendation and timing of the aid recommendation 
have on memory.  Fixed factors in the model are the type of decision aid recommendation 
and timing of the decision aid recommendation.  Covariates for subjects’ rating of the 
perceived usefulness of the aid and student type are included in the model.3 
                                                                 
3 Throughout the data analysis, covariates for subjects’ rating of the perceived usefulness of the aid, 
subjects’ perceived reliability of the aid, and student type were included during initial analyses.  When any 




Hypothesis two addresses the potential for the decision aid recommendation to 
influence the decision-maker’s search strategy and cue usage.  An ANOVA model is 
utilized to examine the effect of the decision aid recommendation on information search 
and cue usage.  The dependent variables are search direction and direction of cue usage.  
Fixed factors in the model are type of decision aid recommendation and timing of the 
decision aid recommendation. 
Hypothesis three examines the effect of the timing of decision aid 
recommendations on decision-making processes.  A Repeated Measures model and an 
ANOVA model are used to examine differences in memory reconstruction and search 
and cue usage direction, respectively, due to the timing of the aid recommendation.  
Dependent variables are memory reconstruction, search direction index, and cue direction 
index.  Fixed factors in the model are type of decision aid recommendation and timing of 
the decision aid recommendation. 
Hypothesis four proposes that decision aid recommendations affect decision-
makers’ final judgments.  An ANOVA model is employed to examine the effect of the 
type of decision aid recommendation and timing of the decision aid recommendation on 
final assessments.  The dependent variable is the final assessment.  Fixed factors in the 




A total of 198 subjects participated in experiment two.  One subject was removed 
from the analyses because of a failure to complete the experiment, leaving a total sample 
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size of 197.  Minor technical difficulties arising during the experiment caused a loss of 
data for some subjects for various measurements, thus the sample size varies across 
different statistical tests.  The technical problems encountered were spread evenly among 
treatments. 
Table 6 provides descriptive statistics on the subjects for experiment two.4  
Several observations are worth noting.  There appear to be significant differences 
between New/Consistent items and New/Inconsistent items overall for both types of aid 
recommendations.  Direction of cue usage is more negative for negative aid 
recommendations than it is for positive aid recommendation.  However, search direction 
appears essentially the same for both positive and negative aid recommendations.  Final 
assessments are toward opposite ends of the scale, with positive recommendations 




The manipulation and attention checks described for experiment one are the same 
for experiment two.  Those checks provide support that subjects understood the task, 
understood the information given them, exerted effort on the task, and believed that the 
decision aid was credible. 
 
                                                                 
4 Data were analyzed for normality and to identify outliers.  Boxplots, histograms, and normal probability 
plots were examined.  No extreme outliers were noted and the hypothesis of normality was not rejected.  
Due to some variety in the subject pool, variables were also cross-tabulated to ensure even spreads across 
treatments.  For example, student type, whether graduate or undergraduate student, and undergraduate 
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Effect of Decision Aid Recommendations on Memory 
Hypothesis one predicts that decision-makers receiving a decision aid 
recommendation will reconstruct memory for financial data to match the affective 
response induced by the aid recommendation.  As in experiment one, I test hypothesis 
one with a paired t-test comparing percentage of times New/Consistent items were 
identified as being in the original dataset with percentage of times New/Inconsistent 
items were identified as being in the original dataset.  The result of the paired t-test is 
highly significant (t = 13.636, n = 195, p<0.0001).  There are a significantly greater 
percentage of inaccurate New/Consistent identifications than inaccurate New/Inconsistent 
identifications.  This provides support for hypothesis one. 
I further test hypothesis one with a Repeated Measures ANOVA model 
comparing the percentage of times New/Consistent items were identified as being in the 
original dataset with the percentage of times New/Inconsistent items were identified as 
being in the original dataset.  This measure of reconstruction is essentially the difference 
between positive identification of New/Consistent items and positive identification of 
New/Inconsistent items.  It captures the extent to which incorrect identification is 
consistent with, or in the direction of, the aid recommendation.  A significantly greater 
percentage of identification of New/Consistent items as compared to New/Inconsistent 
items supports reconstruction of memory to match the decision aid recommendation. 
Fixed factors in the model are the type of decision aid recommendation and 
timing of the decision aid recommendation, with perceived usefulness of the aid and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
GPA, were considered, among others.  Chi-square tests were not statistically significant.  Any variation was 
spread evenly across treatments. 
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student type included as covariates.  Repeated Measures analysis is a more powerful test 
of hypothesis one as it allows for the examination of the effects of type of decision aid 
recommendation and timing of decision aid recommendation on memory reconstruction.  
It allows a comparison of inaccurate New/Consistent identifications with inaccurate 
New/Inconsistent identifications while controlling for the effect of between-subjects 
factors, type of aid recommendation and timing of aid recommendation.  It also allows 
for the examination of the effect of the between-subjects effects on the repeated measure. 
To provide a preliminary view of the analysis, Table 7 presents mean percentages 
for inaccurate New/Consistent identifications and inaccurate New/Inconsistent 
identifications split by both the type of aid recommendation and the timing of the aid 
recommendation.  It is evident that there are higher percentages of inaccurate 
New/Consistent identifications than inaccurate New/Inconsistent identifications across all 
treatments.  Table 8 Panel A presents the results of the within-subjects analysis of the 
Repeated Measures ANOVA model.  As in experiment one, the item of primary interest 
is reconstruction.  Reconstruction is highly significant at p<.0001.  There are a 
significantly greater percentage of inaccurate New/Consistent identifications than 
inaccurate New/Inconsistent identifications.  This provides evidence in support of 
hypothesis one.  Taken with the results of experiment one, I conclude that memories are 
reconstructed to be consistent with the decision aid recommendation. 5 
                                                                 
5 A group with no decision aid recommendation was included in the experimental design to allow for 
additional tests of the robustness of memory reconstruction results.  The group without a decision aid 
recommendation was expected to exhibit approximately equal inaccurate identifications of New/Consistent 
ratios and inaccurate identifications of New/Inconsistent ratios.  I am unable to perform reliable tests on the 
no-aid group, however.  The graduate students in the no-aid group had much lower initial and final 
assessments than all other subjects, including those in early aid treatments who had not received a decision 




Effect of Decision Aid Recommendations on Information Search and Cue Usage 
Hypothesis two predicts that decision aid recommendations will influence users’ 
search patterns and the cues they use.  More specifically, hypothesis 2a predicts that 
decision-makers using a decision aid will search more positive (negative) information 
when the decision aid’s recommendation is positive (negative).  Hypothesis 2b predicts 
that decision-makers using a decision aid will rank positive (negative) information cues 
as more important than negative (positive) cues when the decision aid’s recommendation 
is positive (negative). 
Hypothesis 2a and 2b are both tested with an ANOVA model.  For search, the 
dependent measure is the search direction index, a measure of the extent of the positive or 
negative valence of searched items.  Table 9 Panel A provides the results of the ANOVA 
model for search direction.  Neither aid type nor aid timing is statistically significant as a 
main effect, but the interaction is statistically significant at the .05 level.  Only the early 
and delayed treatments are examined because in the late aid treatment the aid 
recommendation is given after search, and therefore it cannot affect search.  Figure 8 
presents a plot of the interaction.  It reveals that those receiving early aid 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
experiments.  This favorable assessment bias, or deviation from a neutral assessment, is a significant 
predictor of memory reconstruction in the no-aid group.  That is, these subjects formed favorable 
impressions from the neutral ratio set, and they exhibited reconstruction consistent with this positive bias.  
It appears that these subjects viewed the neutral data, formed an overall positive impression, and 
reconstructed memories to match the affective response to the data.  This finding is consistent with the 
results of Kida et al. (1998).  In addition, there are other anomalies in the no-aid group that cannot currently 
be explained.  For example, the no-aid group made significantly more ratio identification errors for some 
ratios than any other treatment group.  Based on the available data, it also appears that all extreme 
observations are congregated in the no-aid group.  Further research will be needed to determine what 
occurred with this no-aid treatment group and why it differed from previous pilot groups.  It is possible that 
some form of maturation effect occurred, because the subjects in question performed the task on the same 
day and most of the subjects knew each other well. 
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recommendations search in a direction consistent with the aid recommendation while 
those receiving the delayed aid recommendation tend to search for items that disconfirm 
the aid recommendation. 
While there is no main effect for aid type as predicted by hypothesis two, the aid 
type does influence search patterns when the timing of the aid recommendation is 
considered.  Aid recommendations influence search patterns and support is provided for 
hypothesis 2a.  An examination of the overall mean search direction index yields 
additional insight.  The mean search direction index is -4.56.  On average, subjects tended 
to search more negative informational cues than positive informational cues.  A one-
sample t-test confirms this is significantly different from zero at p<.0001 (t = -7.746, df = 
126).  Subjects’ search patterns are more directed toward negative items than positive 
items.6 
These results are consistent with findings in both psychology and accounting 
literature.  Psychology literature finds that people seek out evidence to confirm an initial 
hypothesis (Einhorn and Hogarth 1981).  In accounting, although there are indications of 
this as well (Klayman and Ha 1987; Danos et al. 1989), in general, accountants are not as 
susceptible to confirmation bias (Kida 1984; Asare 1992), and are more prone to seek out 
disconfirming evidence due to a disposition toward professional skepticism (Ashton and 
Ashton 1988; Smith and Kida 1991; Bonner and Pennington 1991).  It appears that 
receiving the aid recommendation early creates a strong initial affective response and 
initial hypothesis.  This leads to a confirmation bias.  When the aid recommendation is 
                                                                 
6 Two measures of search index were analyzed.  Using the alternate measure of search direction, neither 
main effect nor the interaction was statistically significant, although the mean search difference was still 
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delayed, the data may become the basis for an initial hypothesis.  However, due to the 
neutrality of the data, a strong response is not produced.  When the aid recommendation 
is subsequently received, the aid recommendation’s strong response causes subjects to 
take a disconfirming approach, due to professional skeptic ism.  From this, it can be 
concluded that the aid does affect users’ search patterns with a confirmation bias effect 
for early aid timing and a conservative bias when the aid is delayed. 
Table 9 Panel B presents the results of the ANOVA model used to test whether 
cue usage is influenced by the decision aid.  The dependent variable is the cue direction 
index, a measure of the extent of the positive or negative valence of cues subjects 
reported as most important.  While aid timing is not statistically significant, aid type is 
statistically significant at p<.01.7  Subjects receiving negative aid recommendations 
ranked a greater number of negative cues as being important than they ranked positive 
cues as being important.  The aid influences the cues subjects deem to be important.  
Therefore, hypothesis 2b is supported. 
 
Timing of the Decision Aid Recommendation 
Hypothesis three predicts that the level of influence the decision aid 
recommendation has on the decision-maker’s memory and cognitive processes will 
depend on when during the decision-making process the aid recommendation is received.  
In particular, those receiving the aid recommendation early in the process will exhibit less 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
significantly different from zero at the .01 level.  The measure of search reported in Table 9 attempts to 
capture the relative importance of cues examined and therefore provides more meaningful insight. 
7 Two measures of cue usage index were analyzed.  Using the alternate measure of cue usage direction, 
results are essentially unchanged. 
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memory reconstruction and different search and cue usage patterns than those receiving 
the aid recommendation later in the process. 
I test hypothesis 3a with a Repeated Measures ANOVA model with the rate of 
identification of the New/Consistent items as being in the original dataset and rate of 
identification of New/Inconsistent items as being in the original dataset as the dependent 
repeated measure.  Timing of the aid recommendation and type of the aid 
recommendation are the fixed factors in the model.  Two covariates are included in the 
model: perceived usefulness of the aid and student type.  Panel B of Table 8 presents the 
between-subjects effects.  Both covariates are statistically significant.  Aid timing is 
statistically significant at p<.01.  Figure 9 reveals that subjects receiving aid 
recommendations early and delayed have greater amounts of reconstruction than those 
receiving aid recommendations late do.  This is in the opposite direction predicted by 
hypothesis 3a.  A potential explanation for this result lies in the way reconstruction 
between-subjects effects are tested with the Repeated Measures model.  For between-
subjects effects, tests of significance are based on differences in the average of total 
New/Consistent errors plus total New/Inconsistent errors.  Therefore, the repeated 
measures model fails to consider differences in New/Consistent errors relative to other 
errors.  To further test for the effect of timing on reconstruction, I use an ANOVA model 
with inaccurate New/Consistent identifications minus inaccurate New/Inconsistent 
identifications as the dependent variable.  Fixed factors are type of aid recommendation 
and timing of the aid recommendation.  Table 10 presents results of the ANOVA model.  
Aid timing is not statistically significant and hypothesis 3a is not supported. 
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I test both hypotheses 3b and 3c with ANOVA models.  For hypothesis 3b and 3c 
the dependent variables are search direction index and cue usage direction index, 
respectively.  Aid timing and type of aid recommendation are the fixed factors.  Panels A 
and B of Table 9 present the ANOVA models of the effect of aid timing on search and 
cue usage, respectively.  Aid timing is not statistically significant in either model.  
However, for search direction, there is a statistically significant interaction between aid 
type and aid timing.  Therefore, timing of the aid does affect search direction, but is 
dependent on the type of aid recommendation.  Hypotheses 3b is supported while 
hypothesis 3c is not supported. 
 
Effect of Decision Aid Recommendations on Judgment 
Hypothesis four predicts that decision aid recommendations will influence the 
final judgments of users.  Specifically, it predicts that decision-makers using a decision 
aid will reach more positive (negative) final judgments when the aid's recommendation is 
positive (negative). 
Results of an ANOVA model with the final assessment as the dependent variable 
and the type of the aid recommendation and the timing of the aid recommendation as 
fixed factors are presented in Panel A of Table 11.  Aid type is statistically significant at 
p<.0001, while aid timing is not statistically significant.  Subjects receiving a positive aid 
recommendation had a mean final assessment of 43.41 and subjects receiving a negative 
aid recommendation had a mean final assessment of 69.47.  The direction of aid 
recommendation does influence final judgment.  Therefore, hypothesis four is supported. 
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Further insight is gained by looking at the revision made to assessments, 
comparing the change from the initial assessment to the final assessment.  Using the 
assessment revision as the dependent variable, and the type of the aid recommendation 
and the timing of the aid recommendation as fixed factors, Panel B of Table 11 presents 
the results of the ANOVA model.  Neither aid type nor aid timing is statistically 
significant at the .05 level.  The interaction effect of aid type and aid timing is statistically 
significant at p<0.0001.  Graphs of assessment revision in figures 10a and 10b reveal that 
early aid recommendations differ from delayed and late aids, but delayed and late aids 
follow similar patterns.  Just as in experiment one, it is no surprise that receiving the aid 
recommendation early results in a major bias in judgment which is “neutralized” 
somewhat (but not completely) as additional information is acquired.  As expected, much 
reliance is placed on the decision aid in the absence of other information.  Once other 
information is received, the decision-maker begins to rely on their own judgment, 
although not completely. 
Figure 11 presents a plot of the three assessments made split by aid timing and aid 
type.  Taken with the other results, this suggests that while timing does not matter for the 
final assessment it does have an effect on judgments prior to the final assessment.  As 
long as the aid recommendation is received at some point prior to final judgment, all 








Discussion and Conclusions  
Decision aids have been recommended to support decision-makers in tasks where 
human information-processing limitations and individual differences limit performance.  
In high load environments individuals’ processing capacities are heavily taxed and 
decision aids may be of great value in helping users cope with increased cognitive 
demands.  Numerous studies support positive outcomes of decision aid use in a variety of 
settings.  The focus of most research tends to be on the outcomes of the decision-making 
process.  While the potential effects of decision aid use on decision processes are 
acknowledged, there is little evidence to explain how decision aid use affects the user.  
The effects of aids on decision processes may lead to detrimental effects that, had they 
been previously considered, could have been mitigated through user training, task 
structure, decision aid design, or some combination of these.  This study examines the 
use of decision aids and the influence they exert, both positive and negative, on all phases 
of the decision-making process. 
There are six key findings from this research: (1) decision aid recommendations 
create strong affective responses that are encoded in memory and cause users to 
reconstruct memories of financial data to be consistent with the affective response, (2) 
receiving a decision aid recommendation at the start of a task creates a strong initial 
response that acts as an initial hypothesis wherein users’ subsequent information search 
patterns exhibit a confirming bias, (3) receiving a decision aid recommendation later in 
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the task creates a strong response that initiates professional skepticism and causes users’ 
subsequent information search patterns to exhibit a disconfirming bias, (4) decision aid 
recommendations influence the choice of information cues users believe to be important, 
(5) decision aid recommendations exert influence on users’ judgments, with the amount 
of influence diminishing as additional information is received, and (6) working memory 
capacity is a determinant in the ability to recall financial information but does not 
determine the extent of influence decision aid recommendations have on users.  These 
findings, when considered together, validate the need for a more complete examination of 
how decision aids impact the entire decision-making process to identify potential 
negative consequences in addition to proposed benefits.  Understanding the effects 
decision aids have on inputs to the decision process and the decision processes employed 
is as essential as understanding the impact they have on the outputs of the decision 
process.  Results indicate that unintended consequences do arise from decision aid use 
that significantly affect decision-making.  In addition, the results indicate that to 
minimize the detrimental effects of aid use, task structure must be considered when 
incorporating decision aids into deterministic tasks. 
The first finding extends the literature on affective responses to financial 
information.  Both data and peripheral cues have been found to elicit affective responses 
that persist in memory, causing users to reconstruct memories of financial data to match 
the affective response (Kida et al. 1998, 2001; Rose 2001).  Decision aid 
recommendations have a similar effect on memory.  As evidenced in several of the 
findings, in addition to causing users to reconstruct memories, the affective response 
generated by the decision aid recommendation influences subsequent decision processes.  
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Particularly, information search patterns exhibit either a confirming or a disconfirming 
bias, depending on when the aid recommendation is received.  Decision aid 
recommendations also influence what cues users believe to be most important, directing 
users to consider cues consistent with the affective response of the aid recommendation 
as more important than cues inconsistent with the affective response.  This has 
implications for both task efficiency and task effectiveness.  While disconfirming a 
hypothesis tends to be the most efficient method of hypothesis testing, there is a tendency 
to do otherwise (Harris 1981).  The structure of the task can be organized so as to 
promote a more efficient disconfirming strategy.  To promote the investigation of 
conflicting evidence, decision aid recommendations could be provided later in the 
decision-making process.  The additional information provided by the decision aid can 
both provide support for or against the hypothesis and be a catalyst for further inquiry.  In 
turn, a more complete search and consideration of information should lead to greater 
effectiveness (Solomon and Shields 1995; Cloyd 1995). 
The fifth finding is also noteworthy.  The influence of decision aid 
recommendations on judgments tends to decrease as additional information is acquired.  
Because decision aid recommendations have a strong influence on judgments, 
particularly in the absence of other information, care must be taken to structure the task 
or provide an environment that promotes complete consideration of all relevant 
information so task effectiveness is not compromised.  If time pressure or other 
environmental factors interrupt or otherwise cut short the decision-making process, aid 
recommendations previously received have the potential to exert undue influence.  While 
this may be beneficial in cases where the decision aid is known to be more accurate than 
 
 71 
individuals but there is a tendency to ignore the aid, the potential also exists for adverse 
consequences in situations where the input of the individual is a crucial and necessary 
aspect of the decision.  Consideration of the nature of the task, the nature of the decision-
maker, and the environment need to be considered in structuring the task. 
The finding that working memory capacity determines the ability to recall 
financial information is not surprising.  Sufficient working memory capacity is necessary 
to manipulate and encode information successfully.  Limitations in working memory 
capacity would be expected to lead to a lower ability to recall detailed information.  What 
is surprising is that I failed to find results that working memory capacity is a determinant 
of the extent of influence decision aid recommendations have on users.  To cope with 
greater restrictions of working memory capacity, individuals must rely more on chunking 
of data.  Decision aid recommendations are a form of data chunking, as they incorporate 
multiple pieces of information into a single chunk.  Therefore, it was expected that 
individuals with more limited working memory capacities would rely on the automatic 
chunking provided by the decision aid to a greater extent than individuals with greater 
working memory capacities.  One possibility for the failure to find results may lie in the 
type of subjects participating in the study.  It is possible that none of the subjects 
participating in this study were truly of "low" working memory capacity such that effects 
would be evident.  The subject pools in many psychology studies that find working 
memory capacity effects are likely characterized as having much variation in memory-
related abilities.  The accounting and business students in this study possessed very 
similar working memory capacities, and it is possible that the working memory capacity 
task employed did not truly distinguish between high and low subjects. 
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The findings should also be valuable to decision aid reliance researchers.  The 
decision aid reliance literature suggests that users rely or do not rely on decision aids 
based primarily upon a comparison of the user’s decision and the aid’s recommendation.  
However, this measure is problematic because it fails to consider how the decision aid is 
incorporated into the user's decision-making process, especially when outputs and 
recommendations do not agree.  An improved measure of reliance would consider how 
decision aids influence other phases of the decision-making process (Rose 2002; 
Kachelmeier and Messier 1990; Whitecotten and Butler 1998).  My results suggest that 
subjects do incorporate decision aid recommendations into their decision-making process, 
and many of these effects are not revealed by examining only outputs.  I find that a 
decision aid affects judgment, but I also find that memories, search patterns, and cue 
usage are significantly influenced by decision aids.  The study provides some rationale 
for examining memory patterns and information search as unobtrusive means to more 
appropriately measure reliance.  Decision aids influence the entire decision-making 
process, and this study offers several new variables that could be employed to determine 
the effects of decision aids on judgment, decision-making, and reliance. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
The intended experimental setting was novice use of a decision aid in a 
deterministic task.  Whether these results would extend to other task types or settings is 
unknown.  The effect of varying levels of experience on the effects of decision aid use is 
warranted.  Prior research finds that “experts” often ignore or fail to rely on decision aids, 
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while novices tend to rely on aid advice.  An extension of this research could examine if 
and how results differ for more expert subjects. 
Measurement of search patterns was restricted.  While subjects were given the 
opportunity to search for a maximum of six information items, six items was also the 
minimum requirement of the search component.  Whether subjects would have searched 
for six items without these restrictions cannot be determined.  Results could differ if 
totally unrestricted search was allowed.  Future research could manipulate search time 
pressure to promote more importance-based sequential search.  This would allow for an 
alternate measure of search importance to the measure employed in this study.  
Additionally, time-based measures may provide a valuable addition to the measure of 
search that could capture search importance to a greater degree.  Time spent viewing 
information could provide additional information on the relative importance of cues.  
Similarly, measurement of cue usage required subjects to rank the six most important 
cues.  Alternative measures of cue usage could provide more information on the relative 
importance of each cue. 
The experiment was conducted over the Internet using a web browser interface.  
There exists the possibility that affinity (or repulsion) toward the Internet might have 
affected results.  Additionally, the decision aid was a seemingly static decision aid.  It 
may have lacked validity due to its lifeless nature.  Future research could explore whether 
the form and nature of the decision aid alters results.  Interactive decision aids may have 
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Table 1.  Operation-Word Span Task. 
 
 
Operation Word Operation Word
[(5/1)-(3X2)]+4=3 need [(7/1)-(2X1)]+6=12 dress
[(2/1)+(7X7)]-2=51 set [(9/3)+(6X4)]-3=24 tall
[(4X2)-(10/2)]+1=4 pair [(6X1)+(9/1)]-6=8 bible
[(4/2)+(9X2)]-1=21 dust [(4/2)+(8X1)]-2=10 snake
[(5/1)+(6X1)]-1=12 lock [(9/3)-(2X1)]+1=2 hard
[(3/1)-(3X2)]+3=0 rock [(4/1)+(7X2)]-4=15 tool
[(9X7)+(9/3)]-1=68 wire [(10/1)-(3X2)]+3=7 skill
[(6/2)-(4X2)]+8=3 close [(10X2)-(4/2)]+3=21 near
[(6X2)-(5/1)]+2=9 break [(2X1)-(4/2)]+1=1 desk
[(3/1)+(6X2)]-2=15 beach [(8/1)+(9X1)]-5=10 bird
[(10/1)+(6X3)]-1=29 hall [(8X4)-(8/1)]+2=26 dance
[(4/2)+(10X2)]-1=22 green [(5/5)-(3X1)]+4=2 send
[(6X3)+(6/3)]-2=20 camp [(9/1)-(4X2)]+8=8 key
[(3/1)+(10X5)]-1=54 cut [(10/2)-(8X1)]+6=5 wait
[(6X4)-(10/1)]+1=15 help [(2/2)+(4X2)]-2=8 moon
[(9/1)+(6X4)]-7=27 stay [(8/1)+(8X4)]-6=36 tree
[(10/2)-(3X1)]+4=6 aim [(10/1)-(6X2)]+7=5 gas
[(8X1)-(3/3)]+5=12 forth [(3/3)-(2X1)]+1=0 door
[(4X2)-(5/1)]+1=4 roll [(5/1)-(3X2)]+4=3 fight
[(6X4)-(4/1)]+1=21 jump [(3/1)-(6X1)]+9=6 trade
[(10X2)-(8/1)]+3=15 cause [(8/4)+(6X3)]-2=18 head
[(3X2)-(5/5)]+1=2 arm [(4X2)+(3/1)]-2=7 guest
[(9/1)-(4X2)]+6=8 blue [(10/1)+(6X4)]-9=24 back
[(3X1)+(10/1)]-2=13 knife [(4/2)+(9X2)]-1=17 shall
[(3/1)-(4X1)]+1=0 mouth [(7X2)+(6/2)]-1=19 dream
[(10/2)+(7X3)]-4=2 score [(7X7)+(2/1)]-1=52 curve
[(7X7)-(6/2)]+1=47 knee [(9/1)-(5X2)]+5=4 buy
[(10X6)-(10/2)]+1=56 sum [(7X1)+(3/3)]-6=4 far
[(3X2)+(9/3)]-1=9 heat [(10/1)-(4X2)]+3=5 rain
[(7X2)-(2/2)]+3=16 add [(10/2)-(4X1)]+4=5 taste
[(7X1)-(3/1)]+6=10 guy [(10/1)-(3X4)]+9=7 brain
[(8X1)-(9/3)]+8=13 own [(10/1)+(3X3)]-5=12 town
[(6/2)-(2X1)]+1=2 file [(10/2)-(3X2)]+6=6 meal
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1 Averaged across aid timing. 
 
Variable N Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Positive Aid Recommendation1:
New/Consistent 33 32.6% 24.6% 0.0% 75.0%
New/Inconsistent 33 6.1% 15.3% 0.0% 50.0%
Final assessment 33 35.7 21.1 0.0 75.0
Revision of assessment 33 -4.0 21.7 -62.0 57.0
Working memory span 33 50.1 8.0 34.0 65.0
Self-perceived usefulness of the aid 33 56.2 33.5 0.0 100.0
Self-perceived reliability of the aid 33 54.9 29.6 0.0 100.0
Negative Aid Recommendation1:
New/Consistent 31 50.0% 28.1% 0.0% 100.0%
New/Inconsistent 31 8.9% 18.9% 0.0% 75.0%
Final assessment 31 68.9 21.1 10.0 90.0
Revision of assessment 31 -1.3 20.3 -50.0 60.0
Working memory span 31 48.9 9.2 25.0 63.0
Self-perceived usefulness of the aid 31 61.0 37.3 0.0 100.0
Self-perceived reliability of the aid 31 65.4 24.6 10.0 100.0
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1 Working memory capacity was also included in the model as a categorical variable with 
subjects split into groups of high and low working memory capacities.  Results using this 
variable are unchanged for the two main effects and interaction.  Working memory 
capacity is not statistically significant for the assessment bias model but is statistically 
significant in the assessment revision model at p = 0.074.  This is most likely an artifact 
due to a lack of adequate variation and small sample sizes. 
 
Panel A: ANOVA on Assessment Bias
Sum of Mean
Source Squares df Square F Sig.
Aid Timing 1.686 1 1.686 0.004 0.950
Aid Type 16622.991 1 16622.991 38.743 0.000
Aid Type * Aid Timing 72.520 1 72.520 0.169 0.682
Working Memory Capacity1 2192.984 1 2192.984 5.111 0.027
Error 25314.728 59 429.063
Total 45365.000 64
R square = .440
Panel B: ANOVA on Assessment Revision
Sum of Mean
Source Squares df Square F Sig.
Aid Timing 22.408 1 22.408 0.077 0.783
Aid Type 182.727 1 182.727 0.624 0.433
Aid Type * Aid Timing 8021.298 1 8021.298 27.407 0.000
Working Memory Capacity1 1278.421 1 1278.421 4.368 0.041
Error 17267.789 59 292.674
Total 27984.000 64
R square = .373
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New/Inconsistent Number Incorrect Assessment Bias Span Score
New/Consistent 0.270 * 0.748 ** 0.214 -0.248 *
0.031 0.000 0.089 0.048
n = 64 n = 64 n = 64 n = 64
New/Inconsistent 0.507 ** -0.033 -0.274 *
. 0.000 0.798 0.029
. n = 64 n = 64 n = 64
Number Incorrect 0.137 -0.363 **
0.281 0.003
n = 64 n = 64
Assessment Bias -0.263 *
. 0.036
. n = 64
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
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1 Working memory capacity was also included in the model as a categorical variable 
indicating high and low working memory capacities.  Results using this variable are 





Panel A: Mean comparisons
All errors
High working memory capacity 22.6%
Low working memory capacity 30.1%
Panel B: ANOVA on New/Consistent minus New/Inconsistent
Sum of Mean
Source Squares df Square F Sig.
Aid Timing 0.015 1 0.015 0.195 0.661
Aid Type 0.322 1 0.322 4.090 0.048
Aid Type * Aid Timing 0.001 1 0.001 0.014 0.908
Working Memory Capacity1 0.023 1 0.023 0.286 0.595
Error 4.652 59 0.079
Total 12.250 64













1 Averaged across aid timing. 
 
Variable N Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Positive Aid Recommendation1:
New/Consistent 97 38.4% 29.8% 0.0% 100.0%
New/Inconsistent 97 11.3% 21.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Cue direction index 1 98 -0.5 1.9 -6.0 4.0
Cue direction index 2 98 -3.0 7.9 -21.0 13.0
Search direction index 1 96 -0.8 1.8 -6.0 4.0
Search direction index 2 96 -5.4 6.6 -21.0 13.0
Final assessment 98 43.4 23.1 0.0 93.0
Revision of assessment 98 -0.6 29.7 -77.0 64.0
Self-perceived usefulness of the aid 98 54.3 29.2 0.0 100.0
Self-perceived reliability of the aid 98 52.7 24.2 0.0 93.0
Negative Aid Recommendation1:
New/Consistent 98 41.8% 28.2% 0.0% 100.0%
New/Inconsistent 98 13.0% 19.7% 0.0% 100.0%
Cue direction index 1 99 -1.2 2.0 -6.0 2.0
Cue direction index 2 99 -6.5 7.7 -21.0 11.0
Search direction index 1 95 -0.5 1.7 -4.0 4.0
Search direction index 2 95 -5.1 6.8 -20.0 11.0
Final assessment 99 69.5 21.4 13.0 100.0
Revision of assessment 99 3.4 23.1 -50.0 64.0
Self-perceived usefulness of the aid 98 61.4 25.7 0.0 100.0
Self-perceived reliability of the aid 98 59.3 24.9 0.0 100.0
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Early Delayed Late Total
35.8%a 45.0% 33.6% 38.4%
14.2%b 12.1% 7.8% 11.3%
46.6% 46.7% 31.5% 41.8%
13.5% 17.5% 8.1% 13.0%
41.8% 45.8% 32.5%
13.8% 14.6% 7.9%
aMean inaccurate New/Consistent identifications.








Table 8.  Repeated Measures ANOVA Model: Reconstructiona – Experiment Two. 
 
 
a The difference between percentage of New/Consistent items incorrectly identified as 
being in the original dataset and percentage of New/Inconsistent items incorrectly 




Panel A: Within-subjects contrasts
Sum of Mean
Source Squares df Square F Sig.
Reconstruction 0.570 1 0.570 13.649 0.000
Reconstruction * Aid Timing 0.070 2 0.035 0.835 0.435
Reconstruction * Aid Type 0.007 1 0.007 0.158 0.691
Reconstruction * Perceived Usefulness of Aid 0.007 1 0.007 0.172 0.678
Reconstruction * Student Type 0.005 1 0.005 0.123 0.727
Panel B: Between-subjects effects
Sum of Mean
Source Squares df Square F Sig.
Aid Timing 0.910 2 0.455 5.949 0.003
Aid Type 0.010 1 0.010 0.127 0.722
Perceived Usefulness of Aid 0.664 1 0.664 8.687 0.004
Student Type 0.320 1 0.320 4.180 0.042
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Panel A: ANOVA for Search Direction Index
Sum of Mean
Source Squares df Square F Sig.
Aid Timing 1.081 1 1.081 0.025 0.875
Aid Type 2.744 1 2.744 0.063 0.802
Aid Type * Aid Timing 176.741 1 176.741 4.053 0.046
Error 5364.114 123 43.611
Total 8183.000 127
R square = .032
Panel B: ANOVA for Cue Usage Direction Index
Sum of Mean
Source Squares df Square F Sig.
Aid Timing 41.998 2 20.999 0.344 0.710
Aid Type 623.317 1 623.317 10.198 0.002
Aid Type * Aid Timing 166.235 2 83.117 1.360 0.259
Error 11613.458 190 61.123
Total 16848.000 196
R square = .066
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Panel A: ANOVA of New/Consistent minus New/Inconsistent
Sum of Mean
Source Squares df Square F Sig.
Aid Timing 0.133 2 0.067 0.800 0.451
Aid Type 0.012 1 0.012 0.144 0.705
Aid Type * Aid Timing 0.227 2 0.114 1.363 0.258
Perceived Usefulness of Aid 0.008 1 0.008 0.100 0.752
Student Type 0.012 1 0.012 0.149 0.700
Error 15.488 186 0.083
Total 31.063 194
R square = .025
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Panel A: ANOVA of Final Assessment
Sum of Mean
Source Squares df Square F Sig.
Aid Timing 424.549 2 212.275 0.429 0.652
Aid Type 33360.269 1 33360.269 67.373 0.000
Aid Type * Aid Timing 1749.140 2 874.570 1.766 0.174
Error 94575.794 191 495.161
Total 759174.000 197
R square = .273
Panel B: ANOVA of Assessment Revision
Sum of Mean
Source Squares df Square F Sig.
Aid Timing 3076.898 2 1538.449 2.977 0.053
Aid Type 836.345 1 836.345 1.619 0.205
Aid Type * Aid Timing 36773.234 2 18386.617 35.583 0.000
Error 98693.721 191 516.721
Total 139165.000 197
R square = .289
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H1: Decision-makers using a decision aid will reconstruct memory for financial 
data to match the affective response induced by the aid recommendation. Supported
H2a: Decision-makers using a decision aid will search more positive (negative) 
information when the decision aid's recommendation is positive (negative). Supported
H2b: Decision-makers using a decision aid will rank positive (negative) 
information cues as more important than negative (positive) cues when the aid's 
recommendation is positive (negative). Supported
H3a: Decision-makers receiving the decision aid’s recommendation early in the 
decision-making process will exhibit less memory reconstruction effects than 
those receiving the aid’s recommendation late in the decision-making process. Not supported
H3b: Decision-makers receiving the decision aid’s recommendation early in the 
decision-making process will exhibit search patterns different from those 
receiving the aid’s recommendation late in the decision-making process. Supported
H3c: Decision-makers receiving the decision aid's recommendation early in the 
decision-making process will exhibit cue usage patterns different from those 
receiving the aid’s recommendation late in the decision-making process. Not supported
H4: Decision-makers using a decision aid will reach more positive (negative) 
final judgments when the aid's recommendation is positive (negative). Supported
H5a: There will be a negative association between decision-makers’ working 
memory capacity and memory reconstruction effects. Not supported
H5b: There will be a negative association between decision-makers’ working 














































































Figure 2.  Operational Model and Hypotheses. 






















H1 Decision-makers using a decision aid will reconstruct memory for financial data to 
match the affective response induced by the aid recommendation.
H2 Decision-makers using a decision aid will exhibit search patterns and cue usage 
patterns influenced by the decision aid recommendation.
H3 The time at which the decision aid's recommendation is introduced will affect the 
level of influence the decision aid recommendation has on the decision-maker’s 
memory and cognitive processes.
H4 Decision-makers using a decision aid will reach more positive (negative) final 
judgments when the aid's recommendation is positive (negative).
H5 Decision-makers’ working memory capacities will be negatively associated with 
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1 Search direction is the extent of the positive or negative valence of searched items 
accounting for the order of search in an attempt to capture the relative importance of 
searched items.  Items searched first receive a weight of 6, items searched second a 
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